Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty--An Appraisal of Uzbekistan\u27s 1998 Law  On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations by Beckwith, Grant Garrard
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 3 Article 15
9-1-2000
Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious
Liberty--An Appraisal of Uzbekistan's 1998 Law
"On Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations"
Grant Garrard Beckwith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Religion Commons, Religion Law
Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grant Garrard Beckwith, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty--An Appraisal of Uzbekistan's 1998 Law "On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations", 2000 BYU L. Rev. 997 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss3/15
BEC-FIN.DOC 9/25/00 10:12 PM 
 
997 
Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious 
Liberty—An Appraisal of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law 
“On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
History teaches that the rise of new nation-states invites immense 
power struggles on a host of sociopolitical fronts.1 From the nuclei 
of intense political, ethnic, and religious tension emerge govern-
ments and constitutions that affect countless numbers of human 
lives. Unquestionably, the early stages of these power struggles are 
the most crucial in defining the contours of individual liberty. 
In the wake of over seventy years of communism, the newly in-
dependent Central Asian state of Uzbekistan is precisely the kind of 
developing nation just described. Though only a nine-year-old po-
litical sovereign,2 Uzbekistan is a millennial3 epicenter of Islam4 that 
remains under the control of ex-communist bureaucrats who are 
steadily increasing their opposition to the free exercise of religious 
liberty.5 
 
 1. See Valeria F. Piacentini, Islam: Iranian and Saudi Arabian Religious and Geopoliti-
cal Competition in Central Asia, in FROM THE GULF TO CENTRAL ASIA: PLAYERS IN THE NEW 
GREAT GAME 25, 26 (Anoushiravan Ehteshami ed., 1994). 
 2. Uzbekistan gained independence from the Soviet Union on August 31, 1991. See 
U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK (1999) [hereinafter 
WORLD FACTBOOK] (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/uz.html#gov>. 
 3. See Robert D. McChesney, Central Asia’s Place in the Middle East: Some Historical 
Considerations, in CENTRAL ASIA MEETS THE MIDDLE EAST 26, 29 (David Menashri ed., 
1998) (stating that Islam in Central Asia remains undiminished nearly a millennium and a half 
after its introduction by Arab armies). 
 4. Uzbekistan is the most populated Central Asian state (over 24 million), 88% of 
whom are Muslim. Contrast Uzbekistan’s mono-religious population with other Central Asian 
states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where the Muslim populations are considerably less 
dominant. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 2. 
 5. See Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America’s Response 
to Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 283, 299 (1998) (“Uzbekistan, now 
released from Soviet control, is governed by ex-communists who see religious expression as a 
threat to their new political power.”); see also Clark Troy, And President Blames Religious Ex-
tremists, BBC MONITORING SERVICE 62599 (June 28, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) 
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This Comment explores the delicate status of religious liberty in 
Uzbekistan through a legal analysis of Uzbekistan’s 1998 legislative 
enactment entitled “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Or-
ganizations” (“1998 Freedom of Conscience Law”).6 This Comment 
also provides an overview of the cultural and historical constructs 
which led to the enactment of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law. 
An analysis of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, when 
viewed against the backdrop of the post-Soviet resurgence of both 
Islamic and non-Islamic faiths in Uzbekistan, makes it clear that Uz-
bekistan is in the unique but extremely volatile position to move in 
one of two directions: (1) forward, toward building a bridge be-
tween Islam and other faiths, or (2) backward, toward any of the 
various Muslim “poles,” which can already be observed in the cleric 
extreme of Iran or the anticleric extreme of Turkey.7 
As will be illustrated, the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Kari-
mov, is pursuing a course of action leading to religious and ethnic 
conflict that could cost the lives of untold numbers of people.8 
 
<http://soros.org/uzbkstan/omri/0205.html> (reporting that on June 25, 1999, Uzbeki-
stan’s President, Islam Karimov, told Uzbekistan’s national news agency that the country is 
experiencing a period of “very difficult” political processes aggravated by religious groups who 
are trying to undermine the country’s security and force a transition from “civilized democratic 
development”). 
 6. Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law came into force on May 15, 1998 
when it was published by the Uzbek press. It was adopted by the Uzbek parliament on May 1, 
1998. See The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Organizations,” Resolution by the Oliy Majlis [Parliament] of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in 
Narodnoye Slovo (Tashkent newspaper “People’s Word” in Russian) (May 15, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law]. An English translation of the law was graciously pro-
vided by Mr. Felix Corely of the Keston Institute. 
 7. The Turkish Islamic model and the Iranian Islamic model are the most commonly 
accepted “competing models” that influence Uzbekistan’s church-state policies. Former 
United States Secretary of State James Baker often referred to the post-Soviet Central Asian 
region as a battleground where “Western-looking Turkey” and “anti-Western Iran” are com-
peting in a zero-sum game. See Paul A. Goble, The 50 Million Muslim Misunderstanding: The 
West and Central Asia Today, in FROM THE GULF TO CENTRAL ASIA: PLAYERS IN THE NEW 
GREAT GAME, supra note 1, at 1, 2-3. 
 8. Indeed, the death toll is already mounting. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: UZBEKISTAN (1999) 
(visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
1999/irf_uzbekist99.html> [hereinafter 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN] (stating that “several 
persons arrested for religious reasons apparently have died from mistreatment in custody”). A 
recent report by one of Uzbekistan’s few registered human rights organizations claims that 
according to some of its calculations “the number of people who suffered (in the form of ar-
rests) for their religious beliefs exceeded 4.5 thousand in 1992 and 6 thousand in 1998-1999,” 
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Warnings of a “new Kosovo” can already be heard.9 This Comment 
will demonstrate that a better course of action must entail a com-
promise—a “middle-of-the-road” approach—incorporated by both 
sides of the conflict (the Karimov regime and the “opposition” mi-
nority religions). In order to reverse the current cycle of polarized 
and amplified religious tensions, the first-step concession must come 
from the Karimov administration. The Karimov administration can 
take the conciliatory first step by tempering the 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law. 
Part II of this Comment sets the stage for the appearance of Uz-
bekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law by exploring the two 
major cultural constructs that led to its enactment: (1) Uzbekistan’s 
antireligious Soviet legacy, and (2) the new landscape of Islam in 
post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 
Part III entails a statutory analysis of the 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law, beginning with the legal antecedents from which the 
law sprang and culminating with an examination of the substantive 
restrictions that it places on fundamental freedoms of religion and 
belief. In addition to suggesting that the 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law essentially criminalizes most forms of religious activity, 
Part III identifies specific provisions contained in the 1998 Freedom 
of Conscience Law that violate international covenants to which Uz-
bekistan has acceded. 
Finally, Part IV contains a few forward-looking considerations 
and suggests a compromise model consisting of two fundamental 
shifts in Uzbekistan’s church-state paradigm, including (1) ameliora-
tion of the overly restrictive 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, and 
(2) relaxed treatment of allegedly “subversive” religious minorities. 
 
 
and then provides biographical sketches of a few of the 38 religious or political prisoners 
known to have died of spurious causes while in Uzbek prisons over the last year alone. HUMAN 
RIGHTS SOCIETY OF UZBEKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN: THE ATMOSPHERE OF TERROR AND 
VIOLENCE, reprinted in Justin Burke, Human Rights Update from Uzbekistan, BBC 
MONITORING SERVICE 110899 (Nov. 8, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros.org/ 
uzbkstan/omri/0350.html>. 
 9. Statement of Max van der Stoel, Commissioner for National Minorities with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”), AOLNews@aol.com press 
release (Nov. 22, 1999) [hereinafter van der Stoel Statement]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section explores the two major historical and cultural con-
structs that undergird Uzbekistan’s controversial 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law: (1) Uzbekistan’s antireligious Soviet legacy and (2) 
the new landscape of Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. 
A. Uzbekistan’s Antireligious Soviet Legacy 
“We must combat religion—that is the ABC of all materialism . . . . 
[I]t must be linked up with the concrete practice of the class move-
ment, which aims at eliminating the social roots of religion.”10  
 Thus spoke Lenin, one of the infamous demigods of communist 
ideology, and thus was Karimov taught from his youth, at least by 
the state, to consider religion as the “opium for the people.”11 Prior 
to 1991, many Sovietologists claimed that communist policy and 
ideology was a failure in Central Asia, and that the deep-rooted cul-
ture of political Islam posed one of the greatest challenges to the 
predominately Russian USSR.12 Such statements seemed to suggest 
that upon independence, the Central Asian states, and Uzbekistan in 
particular, would see an immediate resurgence of political Islam, 
characterized most notably by the replacement of Soviet appointed 
political leaders with popularly elected Islamic religious heads. With 
the advantage of perfect hindsight, however, it is now clear that this 
was simply not the case. The fact remains that the national commu-
nist party leaders which ruled the Central Asian Republics under the 
Soviet regime are the same that rule the newly independent Central  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10.  V.I. Lenin, Socialism & Religion, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS 83-84, 86 (1978), 
reprinted in MEHRDAD HAGHAYEGHI, ISLAM AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 13-14 (1995). 
 11. Id. The phrase “opium for the people” was used widely by Soviet leaders and be-
came one of the slogans of communist antireligious thought. See Zahid I. Munavvarov, Uzbeki-
stan, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS 133, 139 (Mohiaddin Mesbahi ed., 1994). 
 12. See M. Nazif Shahrani, Muslim Central Asia: Soviet Development Legacies and Future 
Challenges, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS AFTER THE SOVIET UNION 56, 56-57 (Mo-
hiaddin Mesbahi ed., 1994). 
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Asian states today,13 although they have given their parties new 
names that avoid conjuring up images of hammer and sickle.14 
Obviously, religion all across the USSR did not simply evaporate 
during seven decades of Communism, but to be sure, it was severely 
and ruthlessly stifled.15 For those newly independent states who had 
long resisted Soviet control (especially in the cases of the Eastern 
European breakaways such as the Baltic States), the fall of Commu-
nism was like the breaking of a dam, which yielded rapid and flood-
like departures from antireligious Soviet doctrine. Central Asia, on 
the other hand, did not shed the Soviet mentality of control so 
quickly, in part because Central Asia did not necessarily welcome or 
push for independence and change. In fact, during the last months 
of the USSR’s existence, the Central Asian republics were the only 
Soviet states where citizens turned out en masse to vote in favor of 
the March 1991 referendum for the Soviet Union’s perpetuation and 
where “[u]p until the very last minute, almost all of Central Asia’s 
leaders maintained hope that the union could be saved.”16 The ex-
planation was quite simple: the collapse of the Soviet Union meant 
not only the instant cutoff of desperately needed financial support, 
but a mass exodus of highly skilled Russian workers who would leave 
Central Asia behind to wallow in the social and ecological crises that 
were the consequences of fifty years of economic planning.17 
 
 13. See id. at 57; see also LUDMILA POLONSKAYA & ALEXEI MALASHENKO, ISLAM IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 142-43 (1994). Islam Karimov (President of Uzbekistan), Nursultan Nazar-
baev (President of Kazakhstan) and Askar Akaev (President of Kyrgystan) were also the leaders 
of their respective Soviet Republics in 1991 during the dissipation of the Soviet Union. See 
WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 2. 
 14. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 2 (stating that the current controlling parties 
are: Uzbekistan, People’s Democratic Party; Kazakstan, People’s Unity Party; Kyrgyzstan, So-
cial Democratic Party). 
 15. Within the borders of Russia itself, only 12 Christian Orthodox bishops remained 
alive by the end of the 1930s and of the 1105 monasteries and convents existing in 1917, only 
six monasteries and ten convents remained in 1986. Virtually all of the approximately 200 
Buddhist temples and monasteries were destroyed and thousands of lamas were sent into exile 
or killed. Jews were persecuted and exterminated beginning with a campaign initiated by Sta-
lin. See ROSANNA KELLEY, RUSSIA 212, 263-64, 281 (1994). In 1985, only two Muslim ma-
drasah (religious schools) in all of Central Asia had legal permission to operate. Martha Brill 
Olcott, Islamic Consciousness and Nationalist Ideology in Central Asia: What Role for Foreign 
Actors, in FROM THE GULF TO CENTRAL ASIA: PLAYERS IN THE NEW GREAT GAME, supra 
note 1, at  6, 13. 
 16. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, CENTRAL ASIA’S NEW STATES, INDEPENDENCE, 
FOREIGN POLICY, AND REGIONAL SECURITY 9 (1996). 
 17. See id.; see also Shahrani, supra note 12, at 57 (stating that the Central Asian public’s 
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Even today, much nostalgia for the Soviet Union lingers on in 
Uzbekistan. In fact, one of the stronger arguments that Karimov will 
not soon adopt a system of political Islam, such as that seen in Iran, 
is that he is a product of antireligious Soviet indoctrination and will 
resist, by nature (or rather, by nurture), the cohabitation of religion 
and party politics. Owing to decades of insistent communist rubric of 
atheism and active suppression of all forms of religion, resistance to 
religion may have become such a deeply engrained part of his gov-
ernment psyche that no religious group, Islamic or otherwise, will 
soon rise to the level of government administration such as is seen in 
neighboring Middle Eastern states. 
This theory of carry-over antireligionism is corroborated by the 
perpetuation in Uzbekistan of the formerly Soviet-sponsored Muslim 
Spiritual Directorates, which were initially established under Soviet 
religious policy to align Muslim believers with Communist policies 
(to the extent possible).18 “Official” Islam was considered to flow 
from the Soviet appointed imams (Muslim leaders) of the Spiritual 
Directorates. Consequently, those Muslims who did not subscribe to 
the Soviet-Muslim partnership (who were, for the most part, mem-
bers of the Suffi sect of Islam) were forced into an underground 
mode of worship and were considered to be reactionary and anti-
government.19 
Little has changed today. The perpetuation of the largely Soviet 
concept of “official” and “unofficial”20 Islam continues to plague the 
 
support of the continuation of Communist rule in their home republics testified of “the con-
siderable success of the Soviet ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ policy goals in the region, 
and not their failure”). 
 18. See Piacentini, supra note 1, at 26. 
 19. See Olcott, supra note 15, at 13; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLASS 
DISMISSED: DISCRIMINATORY EXPULSIONS OF MUSLIM STUDENTS Vol. 11, No. 12 (D) 
(1999) (subsection entitled “Uzbekistan and Islam”) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/1999/uzbekistan/uzbek-02.htm> [hereinafter CLASS DISMISSED] (stating 
that Muslim clerics opposed the Soviet regime). 
 20. See 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (stating that “[t]he Government 
perceives unofficial Islamic groups or mosques as extremist threats and sharply restricts their 
activities”); Victor Spolnikov, Impact of Afghanistan’s War on the Former Soviet Republics of 
Central Asia, in CENTRAL ASIA 96, 107 (Hafeez Malik ed., 1994) (describing some of the 
historical roots of the division between “official” and “nonofficial” Islam); see also CLASS 
DISMISSED, supra note 19 (subsection entitled “The Campaign Against Independent Islam”) 
(stating that the most recent “campaign against ‘unofficial’ Islam began in 1994-1995, with 
the harassment and arbitrary detentions of men wearing beards and the ‘disappearance’ of 
popular independent Muslim clerics, and intensified in 1997, with the closing of mosques and  
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allegedly secular21 regime of Uzbekistan. Those who fall into the 
“unofficial” category include minority religious movements whose 
ideas of pure Islam are not in line with government agendas and 
therefore supposedly not in line with “official” Islam. As was done so 
well by their Soviet progenitors, the present-day Central Asian au-
thoritarians (and Karimov in particular) capitalize on and publicize 
the professed danger of unofficial Islam, using religion as a pretext 
for political persecution and control. 
B. The New Landscape of Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan 
The horizons of religious tolerance in Uzbekistan will clearly be 
affected by factors contributing to national identity. Given the reality 
that Islam is already one of the defining characteristics of the Uzbek 
identity, any legal analysis of constitutional and statutory provisions 
pertaining to religion would not be complete without first under-
standing the Islamic movements that are at the very core of the reli-
gious and highly politicized battles that are being played out both in 
private offices22 and in public streets.23 
 
a broader crackdown on Islamic leaders and other practicing Muslims not affiliated with offi-
cially sanctioned Islamic institutions”). 
 21. The word “secular” is never actually used in Uzbekistan’s constitution to describe 
church-state relations; however, Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, which is 
entitled “Separation of Religion from the State,” begins by stating that “[in] the Republic of 
Uzbekistan religion is separated from the state. Granting any privileges to or imposing restric-
tions upon any individual religion is inadmissible.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra 
note 6, at art. 5. See also CSCE News Release, Uzbekistan Is One of the Most Repressive New 
Independent States, (Oct. 18, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.soros.org/ 
uzbkstan/uzhr10199.html> [hereinafter CSCE News Release] (containing a statement by His 
Excellency Sodyq Safaev, Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan, that “Uzbeks today face 
the numerous challenges of building a secular democracy and opposing the threats of religious 
fundamentalism and political extremism”). 
 22. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN (1999) 
(visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.amnestyusa.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/eur62.htm> (stat-
ing that on May 1, 1999, the same day that Uzbekistan parliament passed the 1998 Freedom 
of Conscience Law, Karimov “endorsed tough measures against ‘those who are trying by any 
means to introduce political Islam, religious extremism and fanaticism’ and told parliament 
that ‘fundamentalists should be shot’”); see also Felix Corley, Soviet-Style Religious Persecution 
Now Returning in Uzbekistan, KESTON NEWS SERVICE (July 28, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 
2000) <http://www.keston.org/scholarsframe.htm> (reporting that the new law was “pre-
pared in secrecy” and that “President Karimov threatened to shoot Wahhabis [members of a 
particular religious minority] personally if deputies failed to approve the new law”); Paul A. 
Goble, Central Asia: Analysis From Washington—Leaders Fail To Read Fundamentalism 
Right, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (May 6, 1998) (visited Mar. 31, 2000) 
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/05/F.RU.980506121701.html.> (“[Karimov] 
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Clearly, Karimov is aware of the fact that his popularity depends 
in large part upon his maintaining a religious and particularly pro-
Islamic image. Indeed, he professes to be a proponent of Islam so far 
as it is politically expedient for him to do so.24 But his political pos-
ture is one that presents a difficult dichotomy for him to overcome: 
Karimov is the president of a people who believe that communism 
has been replaced by a democratic system guaranteeing freedom of 
conscience, yet he is also the undisputed leader of what used to be 
Uzbekistan’s national communist party.25 This dichotomy has re-
sulted in a confusing ideological milieu: Islam and Communism as 
bedfellows in the same “democratic” state. Somehow, Karimov con-
tinues to walk the razor’s edge as an ex-communist party leader who 
is Muslim enough to lead a popular regime in the Mecca of Central 
Asia, yet antireligious enough to quell popular religious movements 
that fall outside of his comfort zone. 
1. Islamic fundamentalism in context 
Islam is political by nature.26 It is arguably “the most politicized 
religion in the world.”27 In part, this is because Islamic doctrine calls 
for strict regulation not only of religious customs but of social and 
political aspects of life as well.28 That being said, one should be care-
ful not to subscribe to the oversimplified assertion that Islam equals 
 
told his country’s parliament that Muslim activists were so dangerous that they ‘must be shot 
in the head.’”). 
 23. On February 16, 1999, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 15 people were killed and over 
100 injured in a series of six explosions intended to kill President Islam Karimov. Uzbek gov-
ernment sources ascribed the explosions to religious extremists. See Fiona Dunne, Religious 
Extremists Were Involved in Tashkent Explosions, INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 23, 1999) 
(visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros.org/uzbkstan/omri/0063.html>. 
 24. For example, Uzbekistan’s Karimov took his presidential oath of office on the Ko-
ran, made the Hajj (religious pilgrimage) to Saudi Arabia on one of his first post-independence 
trips abroad, and told the press that he and his family observe Muslim dietary laws. See 
OLCOTT, supra note 16, at 117. 
 25. See Shahrani, supra note 12, at 57; see also WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 2. 
 26. See POLONSKAYA & MALASHENKO, supra note 13, at 120. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Abdullah Ahmed An-Na-’Im, Human Rights in the Muslim World, 3 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 210, 212 (1996) (stating that Mus-
lim jurists “categorized all fields of human activity as permissible or impermissible and recom-
mended or reprehensible” and that “[m]ost Muslim countries have experienced mounting de-
mands for the immediate application of Shari’a as the sole, or at least primary, legal system of 
the land”). 
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violence.29 It must be remembered that the Islamic world encom-
passes approximately one billion people and constitutes the majority 
population in over forty states, the expected result of which is a wide 
range of manifestations of Islam ranging from the classical Islam (in-
stituted by the prophet Muhammed in 622 A.D.) to contemporary 
Islam that differs markedly from nation to nation.30 But regardless of 
the wide range of beliefs held by Muslims across the world, one 
thing is clear: wherever major Muslim populations exist, the forces 
driving political Islam have been a factor to be reckoned with by 
Muslim and non-Muslim citizens alike.31 
a. Morphology and semantics. The question as to what exactly 
constitutes Islamic “fundamentalism,” or “extremism,” otherwise re-
ferred to by mainstream Islam as “Wahhabism,”32 is still open for 
debate. In attempting to define it, one should understand the his-
torical nexus from which it sprang relative to the Middle East, the 
former USSR, and present day Uzbekistan. 
First, the Arabic term for fundamentalism is usuliya, from the 
word asl which means “root.”33 Fundamentalism is a return to the 
roots of “pure religion” that has been defiled or diluted by subse-
quent events. Central Asian fundamentalism represents a return to 
traditional Islam that was weakened by the nineteenth and twentieth 
century intrusion of communists, atheists, and secularists. Impor-
tantly, all three types of intruders (communists, atheists, and secular-
ists) could easily be labeled as “heretics” so far as Islamic tradition 
was concerned—and heresy, like apostasy, is a capital offense34 pun-
 
 29. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 
WIS. INT’L L.J. 349, 364 (1996) (stating that torture and summary execution that occur in 
militant Islamic regimes “do not reflect the will of the Muslim people” and “are not ‘Islamic 
tradition’ any more than they are ‘Catholic’ when they occur in Latin American countries”); see 
also Riffat Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qur’an, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 85 
(1996) (arguing that Islam’s sacred text, the Qu’ran, is a “Magna Carta” of human rights). 
 30. See Arzt, supra note 29, at 356. 
 31. The pervasiveness of Islamic influence over a state can vary from social/cultural to 
legal/political. Some of the most extreme examples are Iran, where legal principles of Shari’a 
law are the primary source of government, and Sudan and Pakistan, where Shari’a law plays a 
significant (though not absolutely controlling) role in government. See An-Na-’Im, supra note 
28, at 212. 
 32. See 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (explaining that the Uzbek gov-
ernment “is determined to prevent the spread of ultraconservative or extremist versions of 
Sunni Islam, which it labels ‘Wahhabism’ and considers destabilizing.”). 
 33. POLONSKAYA & MALASHENKO, supra note 13, at 122. 
 34. See Arzt, supra note 29, at 376-78. 
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ishable by death according to some of the more radical interpreta-
tions of Islam (which explains much of Karimov’s discomfort). Not 
surprisingly, the word “fundamentalism” is not used within Muslim 
circles as loosely as it is used by western onlookers. In fact, both 
mainstream and radical Muslims consider themselves to be funda-
mentalists inasmuch as they both consider themselves to be adher-
ents to the “fundamental” teachings of the Prophet Muhammed.35 
In short, where the western world uses the term “fundamentalist,” 
most Muslims prefer to use such descriptors as “extremist” or “radi-
cal.”36 
b. Wahhabism. The term “Wahhabi” technically refers to a fac-
tion of Islam stemming from an identifiable sect that originated in 
Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century under the leadership of Mu-
hammad ibin ‘Abd al-Wahhab.37 Wahhab’s movement was relatively 
conservative, but advocated independent thinking as a means of puri-
fying the Muslim faith.38 In Central Asia, however, Wahhabism is 
quickly becoming a type of pejorative government buzz word for re-
ligious activity of minority groups in general (particularly groups that 
are unregistered and foreign related).39 
The religious underground community in Uzbekistan, com-
monly referred to as Wahhabites, can be traced back to the 1940s. As 
early as 1943, when only the Soviet sponsored Religious Board of 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan (“SADUM”) had the right to open 
 
 35. Interview with Dr. Abdulhakim Al-Matar (Nov. 16, 1999). Dr. Al-Matar is cur-
rently living in Saudi Arabia but was educated in the United States. He is a practicing member 
of the Sunni mainstream (majority) branch of Islam. 
 36. In the Uzbek Muslim Board’s official public denouncement of the 1999 Tashkent 
bombings, the word “fundamentalist” was not used once, though repeated references were 
made to so called “fanatical dogmatists.” Khalq Sozi (Tashkent newspaper “People’s Word” in 
Russian), Uzbekistan (Feb. 18, 1999), reprinted in Fiona Dunne, Uzbek Muslim Board De-
nounces Religious Extremism, BBC MONITORING SERVICE 22099 (Feb. 20, 1999) (visited 
Mar. 30, 2000) <http://soros.org/uzbkstan/omri/0059.html>. 
 37. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: SAUDI ARABIA (1999) (visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_saudiara99.html>. 
See also CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19, at n.8 (subsection entitled “The ‘Uzbek Way’”) 
(stating that the eighteenth century founder of the Wahhabite strain of Islam was a scholar 
from Arabia named Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab). 
 38. CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19, at n.8 (subsection entitled “The ‘Uzbek Way’”). 
 39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19, 
at n.8 (subsection entitled “The ‘Uzbek Way’”) (stating that the Mufti of Uzbekistan, Abdura-
shid Qori Bahromov, recently claimed that chador, or covering the whole face with exception 
of the eyes, is “Wahhabi, because chador is from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan”). 
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mosques and religious schools, a legion of underground Muslim 
seminaries grew up out of the perceived necessity to preserve classical 
Islam.40 Naturally, those mullahs and teachers who were appointed 
by SADUM to operate the state-registered mosques and religious 
schools were hand-picked for their moderate views and willingness to 
cooperate with Soviet sponsorship.41 All others were considered po-
litically dangerous fundamentalists on whom the KGB kept close 
watch.42 
On June 9, 1990, the first attempt to create a general Muslim 
political party in the Soviet Union took place in Astrakhan, Russia. It 
would be called the Party of Islamic Rebirth (“PIR”), and its found-
ing documents stated that “the invested schemes of [communist] so-
cial development have led mankind to a deep crisis in all spheres of 
life,” and “[w]e see salvation only in following the path of Allah.”43 
PIR’s declared objective was to make Shari’a (traditional Islamic 
law) the essential part of citizens’ daily lives without taking it so far 
as the Iranian-style clerical regime.44 PIR’s members acted immedi-
ately to set up branches throughout Central Asia by organizing 
founding meetings in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The KGB was too 
late in Tajikistan, but Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, fully understand-
ing the implications of a purely Islamic political party in Uzbekistan, 
reacted without delay by sending KGB agents to disrupt the found-
ing meeting in Tashkent, where PIR members were beaten and 
dragged from the meeting.45 Ironically, the KGB’s interference did 
not uproot the newly founded PIR. On the contrary, it acted only to 
force PIR members into a modus operandi incorporating numerous 
smaller branches who went “underground” and who were now 
popularly motivated under the flag of martyrdom and persecution.46 
 
 40. See Olcott, supra note 15, at 13. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Programme and Rules of the Party of Islamic Rebirth 6, 8, reprinted in POLONSKAYA 
& MALASHENKO, supra note 13, at 123-24. Polonskaya and Malashenko also note that this is 
a typically fundamentalist wording, characteristic of all Middle Eastern fundamentalists, from 
Egyptian Sayyed Qutb to the leader of the Libyan revolution Muammar Gaddafi. Id. 
 44. See Farhad Kazemi & Zohreh Ajdari, Ethnicity, Identity and Politics: Central Asia 
and Azerbaijan between Iran and Turkey, in CENTRAL ASIA MEETS THE MIDDLE EAST, supra 
note 3, at 52, 65. 
 45. See POLONSKAYA & MALASHENKO, supra note 13, at 125. 
 46. See id. at 126-27. 
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2. The threat of religious extremism: real or perceived? 
Unquestionably, there is some legitimacy to a general sense of 
apprehension concerning extremist Islamic movements in Central 
Asia. Indeed, a senior official for the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) who recently “warned of a ‘new 
Kosovo’ looming in Central Asia[,]” cited the rapid rise in Islamic 
extremism which threatens stability in the region.47 A Kyrgyz news-
paper, the Utro Bishkeka, recently published an official statement by 
the fundamentalist party “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” pro-
claiming a holy war (or jihad) against Uzbek President Islam Kari-
mov.48 Moreover, the Qur’anic concept of jihad, which literally 
means “struggle in the name of Allah,” is interpreted by radical Is-
lamic movements to have a military connotation.49 
The bombings in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, where fifteen 
people were killed and over one hundred injured,50 are one of the 
Karimov administration’s favorite examples of the potentially deadly 
nature of religious extremism (although the bombings of February 
16 were never conclusively tied to religious extremism).51 Smaller 
scale conflicts, however, are regular and continuing—both in Uz-
bekistan and in bordering countries. On September 21, 1999, press 
releases reported that “fighting [with Islamic militants] . . . left at 
 
 47. van der Stoel Statement, supra note 9. 
A senior OSCE official has warned of “a new Kosovo” looming in Central Asia say-
ing a rapid rise in Moslem extremism endangered stability in the region. Max van 
der Stoel, commissioner for national minorities with the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), called on Western powers to forge an eco-
nomic recovery plan to stave off the threat of civil war . . . . 
Id. 
 48. See Justin Burke, Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan Warns Bishkek, BBC 
MONITORING SERVICE 91699 (Sept. 16, 1999) (visited Mar. 31, 2000) <http://soros.org/ 
uzbkstan/omri/ 0313.html.>. 
 49. The concept of jihad (meaning “sacrifice” in the path of God), entails a related be-
lief that dying in battle is the highest form of praise to Allah; however, jihad does not necessar-
ily require violence. Jihad can also be exercised through preaching and example, a view that is 
espoused by many devout Muslims. See Arzt, supra note 29, at 379. 
 50. See Dunne, supra note 23. 
 51. In fact, despite Karimov’s immediate televised attribution of the bombings to reli-
gious extremists, subsequent investigations showed that the bombings were actually the 
handiwork of foreign terrorists. See Fiona Dunne, Tashkent Bombings–Various, INTERFAX 
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 16, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros.org/uzbkstan/omri 
/0038.html>. A more commonly accepted act of religious terrorism was the 1997 police fatali-
ties in the Namangan region of Uzbekistan. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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least twelve Kyrgyz soldiers dead and more than twice that many 
wounded.”52 On the same day it was reported that Islamic militants 
had been “holding hostages in the mountains for weeks” causing 
“[t]housands of villagers [to flee] their mountain homes.”53 These 
events and a host of others have caused President Karimov to crack 
down on “suspicious” religious activity as a means of rooting out or-
ganizations and individuals considered to be national security 
threats.54 
The greatest fear of all may well be what Olcott has dubbed as 
the “contagion effect,”55 wherein a migratory spillover into Uzbeki-
stan of Wahhabi-indoctrinated Uzbeks from the war-torn countries 
of Tajikistan and Afghanistan56 results in the infection of peaceful 
Central Asian states with the communal violence psychology which is 
blamed for the destruction in Tajikistan.57 Indeed, the threat of civil 
war seems to exist not only in the minds of the Karimov regime,58 
but in the minds of opposition movements as well.59 
 
 52. Bruce Pannier, Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: Militaries Brace For Clashes With Islamic 
Militants, (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/09/F.RU. 
990921140802.html>. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (stating that “authorities are highly 
suspicious of those who are more pious than is the norm: frequent mosque attendees; bearded 
men; and veiled women. In practice this approach results in mistreatment of many devout 
Muslims for their religious beliefs.”). 
 55. Olcott, supra note 15, at 20; see also OLCOTT, supra note 16, at 113. 
 56. As of 1996, nearly 1.2 million Uzbeks were living in Tajikistan and another 1.3 mil-
lion in Afghanistan. See OLCOTT, supra note 16, at 113. 
 57. The Tajik civil war is now over; however, the war was caused by Islamic militants 
who ousted the Soviet carry-over regime from power shortly after the dissipation of the USSR. 
Olcott writes, “The prospect of bloody civil war taking place in a country five times more 
populous is genuinely terrifying.” Id. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT 
ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: TAJIKISTAN (1999) (stating that “[t]he 
post-independence 1992-97 civil war was fought in part over differing views of the role of re-
ligion in the republic”) (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/ hu-
man_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_tajikist99.html>. 
 58. See Justin Burke, Uzbek Police Chief Urges Religious Leaders To Fight Radical Move-
ments, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros.org/uzbkstan/ 
omri/0407.html> (reporting that Uzbek Interior Minister Zokirjon Almatov and Uzbek 
Chairman of the Cabinet’s Department for Religious Affairs, Fozil qori Tursunov, announced 
on January 27, 2000 at the Uzbek capital, Tashkent, that religious extremists had declared war 
on Uzbekistan, and called upon Muslim leaders in the country to wage war against the extrem-
ists themselves). 
 59. Abdurahim Polat, Chairman of the Birlik Party and exiled political opposition 
leader, recently noted that “[e]xiled leaders of democratic opposition decided to delay their 
return to Uzbekistan” because they are “banned from participating in [the January 2000] 
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Whether or not the threat of religious extremism in Uzbekistan 
is real or perceived, the highly publicized government campaign 
against Wahhabites and other minority groups is leading to large-
scale religious intolerance. Karimov claims to be fighting a dangerous 
civil disease by arresting, interrogating, and imprisoning religious ac-
tivists.60 His “war”61 against religious extremism, which is necessarily 
aimed at minority religions, is turning into more than just a figure of 
speech. For example, in early December 1999, over three hundred 
Uzbek agents from the Department of Internal Affairs, accompanied 
by over four hundred members of the people’s militia began a type 
of “special operation,” referred to as a zarba (strike), intended to 
capture and prosecute both “criminals” and “religious extremists.”62 
It is precisely this type of politically convenient overreaction that led 
the Chairman of the OSCE, Bronislav Geremek, to warn Karimov in 
a personal visit that in many Muslim countries, government moves 
against what some call “politicized Islam” and others “Islamic fun-
damentalism” had actually strengthened these groups.63 Indeed, in 
many cases, extremists have no chance to win power unless they are 
perceived as being persecuted.64 
 
campaigns.” He went on to say that “[i]t seems like civil war is unavoidable.” CSCE News Re-
lease, supra note 21. 
 60. See Testimony by the Honorable Robert A. Seiple, Ambassador-at-Large for Inter-
national Religious Freedom, United States Department of State, Hearing: The First Annual 
State Department Report on International Religious Freedom, Oct. 6, 1999 (visited Mar. 16, 
2000) <http://www.house.gov/international_relations/hr/irfseiple.htm.>. Mr. Seiple stated 
the following: 
In Uzbekistan, the Government’s record on respect for religious freedom has long 
been a source of concern. Arbitrary arrests and abuse are pervasive, and judicial pro-
ceedings are often mere rubber stamps. The pattern of harassment and detention of 
members of unregistered Muslim groups is alarming. Recent closed trials that fail to 
meet standards of basic due process have attempted to discredit members of unregis-
tered religious groups as dangerous extremists or criminals. Defendants have been 
convicted of criminal offenses, reportedly based on forced confessions and planted 
evidence. 
Id. 
 61. See Burke, supra note 58. 
 62. Justin Burke, Uzbek Police Conduct Operation Against Religious Extremists, BBC 
MONITORING SERVICE 120699 (Dec. 6, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros.org/ 
uzbkstan/omri/0370. html>. 
 63. See Goble, supra note 22. 
 64. See id.; see also POLONSKAYA & MALASHENKO, supra note 13, at 126-27 (stating 
that one of the paradoxes of the Soviet domestic policy during perestroika was that those reli-
gious minorities who were persecuted most of all by the authorities enjoyed the greatest popu-
larity among the people). 
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To summarize, Part II of this Comment has shown that the con-
vergence of Communism with the new landscape of Islam in Uzbeki-
stan resulted in a volatile atmosphere that was ripe for a preemptive 
government strike to keep political Islam in check. Uzbekistan’s anti-
religious Soviet legacy seems to have been perpetuated by Karimov. 
Against the backdrop of the “Wahhabi” revolution in neighboring 
Tajikistan and a supposedly growing tide of threatening religious and 
political extremism in Uzbekistan, Karimov’s enactment of Uzbeki-
stan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law marks an alarming reaction 
to the revival of religion, the ramifications of which must be fully 
understood by Karimov, the Uzbek people, and the international 
community. 
III. THE 1998 FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE LAW 
From Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991 until the enactment of 
the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, scrutiny of religious activity 
by the Karimov administration seemed to be more a function of pro-
tecting the “secular” ideal of Uzbekistan’s new democracy and less a 
function of large scale religious intolerance.65 But with the passage of 
the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law and subsequent amend-
ments66 to the criminal and civil codes, Karimov gave himself legal 
cover to take extreme measures, including massive curtailment of 
fundamental human rights,67 to ensure that religious activity is kept 
 
 65. See 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (stating that even now “[t]he 
[Uzbek] government does not consider this repression to be directed against religious freedom 
itself but instead against those who desire to overthrow the secular order”). 
 66. Both the Administrative Code and the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan were updated 
in order to “stiffen the penalties for violating the religion law and other statutes on religious 
activities.” 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. See generally On Introduction of 
Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Republic Uzbekistan (1998) (Uzb.). 
 67. Examples of international law containing such fundamental rights include: Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights art. 18 (1948), available in Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (visited Sept. 16, 2000) <http://www.un.org/rights/50/ 
decla.htm> [hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
999 U.N.T.S 171 (1966) art. 18, para. 1-2 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
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under his control (which he deems to be a “legitimate state inter-
est”).68 
Part III.A considers the three most significant legal antecedents 
from which the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law sprang: the Con-
stitution of Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan’s 1991 Freedom of Conscience 
Law, and Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law. Part III.B as-
serts that the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law places Uzbekistan in 
clear violation of its international human rights commitments 
according to three general arguments: (1) it restricts freedom to 
manifest religious convictions; (2) it restricts freedom to disseminate 
religious ideas; and (3) it restricts freedom to assemble for religious 
purposes. Part III.C argues that the 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law has essentially criminalized the most fundamental forms of reli-
gious activity. 
A. Antecedents to the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law 
Uzbekistan’s passage of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law 
should not have been a surprise69 to most people familiar with the 
legal precedents that gave rise to the new law. The 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law is a function of three principle antecedents: (1) the 
Constitution of Uzbekistan, (2) Uzbekistan’s 1991 law entitled 
“Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (“Uzbekistan’s 
1991 Freedom of Conscience Law”), and (3) Russia’s controversial 
1997 law entitled “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Asso-
ciations” (“Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law”). 
 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”); UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 55(c) 
(1945) [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER] (“[T]he UN shall promote universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to . . . relig-
ion.”); see also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief, adopted Jan. 18, 1982, GA Res. 55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1982). 
 68. See Goble, supra note 22. Mr. Goble reported the results of an April 1998 visit be-
tween Karimov and the OSCE Chairman Bronislav Geremek: 
As he has before, Karimov insisted that Islamic fundamentalism was the main threat 
to stability in his country and across the region, that such a movement could either 
destabilize the situation as in Tajikistan or bring to power a theocratic regime as in 
Iran. And [Karimov] further argued that the West must understand the need to take 
strong, even repressive measures against such Muslim activists. 
Id.   
 69. See Corley, supra note 22 (reporting that the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law 
“came like a bolt out of the blue for all Uzbekistan’s religious communities”). 
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1. The Constitution of Uzbekistan 
Adopted on December 8, 1992, Uzbekistan’s Constitution has 
proved to be merely “hortatory and aspirational” at best.70 Constitu-
tional provisions granting freedom of conscience71 are treated as little 
more than the price of admission into such international consortiums 
as the United Nations and the OSCE.72 For example, Article 12 of 
the Uzbek Constitution states that “[n]o ideology shall be granted 
the status of state ideology.”73 To the contrary, however, the gov-
ernment promotes its recommended version of Islam through the 
state-sponsored “Spiritual Directorate for Muslims, which controls 
the Islamic hierarchy, the content of imams’ sermons, and the vol-
ume and substance of published Islamic materials.”74 The govern-
ment also openly funds an Islamic university and subsidizes citizens’ 
participation in the Hajj.75 Similar support is shown to no other 
 
 70. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 711 (1996) (stating that in less developed countries “en-
tire instruments or particular provisions may be meant to be hortatory and aspirational rather 
than to form part of the state’s legal system”). But cf. Michael Wallace Gordon, Of Aspirations 
and Operations: The Governance of Multinational Enterprises by Third World Nations, 16 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 301 (1984), reprinted in RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 922 (1999) (explaining that aspirational declarations are significant not be-
cause they constitute enforceable law but rather for what they imply about “current sentiments 
and possible future law”). 
 71. Article 18 of the Constitution of Uzbekistan cites a list of basic characteristics 
against which the government may not discriminate including “sex, race, nationality, language, 
religion, social origin, convictions and individual and social status.” UZB. CONST. art. 18 
(1992). Article 29 states, “Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of thought, speech and con-
victions. Everyone shall have the right to seek, obtain and disseminate any information, except 
that which is directed against the existing constitutional system and in some other instances 
specified by law.” Id. at art. 29. Article 31 states, “Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all. 
Everyone shall have the right to profess or not to profess any religion. Any compulsory imposi-
tion of religion shall be impermissible.” Id. at art. 31. 
 72. Uzbekistan became a member of both the United Nations and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1992 (the OSCE was the CSCE at the time), United 
Nations’ List of Member States <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> (visited 
Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. Members] (stating that Uzbekistan became a member of the 
UN on March 2, 1992); OSCE Participating States <http://www.osce.org/general/ 
participating_states/partstat.htm> (visited Mar. 16, 2000) [hereinafter OSCE Members] (stat-
ing that Uzbekistan became a member of the OSCE on January 30, 1992, acceded to the Hel-
sinki Final Act on February 26, 1992, and acceded to the Charter of Paris on October 27, 
1993). 
 73. UZB. CONST. art. 12 (1992). 
 74. 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
 75. See id. The Hajj is a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia made by devout Muslims 
all across the world. If monetary resources and distances are constraining factors, some Mus-
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“ideology” in Uzbekistan. This type of interpretive application of the 
Uzbek constitution set an early foundation for a church-state system 
akin to Turkey’s, under which a professedly secularist government 
nonetheless encourage religious indoctrination according to a sym-
pathetic stream of Islam and discourage all other “non-mainstream” 
religion that is, by default, unsympathetic to the regime. 
2. Uzbekistan’s 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law 
Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law is not entirely 
new. In fact, it is actually a series of amendments to an Uzbek relig-
ion law enacted on June 14, 1991.76 The 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law essentially restricts or abolishes most of the significant 
free-exercise provisions in the 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law.77 
Those provisions of the 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law that were 
particularly subject to change dealt with freedom to manifest reli-
gious convictions, freedom to disseminate religious ideas, and free-
dom to assemble for religious purposes.78 
3. Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law 
The third principle antecedent to Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law, and the one which likely provided most of the im-
petus for the new Uzbek law’s ratification, was actually foreign. Rus-
sia’s controversial 1997 law entitled “On Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Associations” (“Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience 
 
lims will only make the trip once in a lifetime, if at all. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: IRAQ (1999) (visited 
Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/ 
irf_iraq99.htm> (stating that the Hajj is a “religious duty of all Muslims who can undertake it” 
and that the Hajj is often a highly politicized issue for participating and non-participating gov-
ernments). 
 76. See Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 289-XII “O Svobode Sovesti i Re-
ligioznikh Organizatsiyakh,” (June 14, 1991) (in Russian) [On Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Associations] [“1991 Freedom of Conscience Law”]. The Russian text of the 1991 
Freedom of Conscience Law was graciously provided by Mr. Felix Corely of the Keston Insti-
tute. 
 77. See Felix Corley, New Uzbek Law On Religion Renders Unregistered Religious Activ-
ity Illegal, KESTON NEWS SERVICE (May 29, 1998) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) 
<http://www.keston.org/scholarsframe.htm> (“In the new version of the law most of the 
articles of the 1991 law are heavily rewritten, with liberal provisions abolished and restrictive 
provisions tightened or, in many cases, introduced for the first time.”). 
 78. See infra Part III.B for more detailed comparisons between the 1991 and 1998 ver-
sions of Uzbekistan’s Freedom of Conscience legislation. 
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Law”)79 was passed by Boris Yeltsin a mere seven months prior to the 
enactment of Uzbekistan’s Freedom of Conscience Law.80 In reality, 
Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law turns out to be a 
non-innovative but extremely harsh replicate of its Russian counter-
part. Although Karimov had excuses81 to pass a harsher religion law 
(relative to Uzbekistan’s 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law) regard-
less of Russia’s lead, he was likely bolstered82 in his resolve to pass 
the new law in light of Moscow’s harsh legislative move against reli-
gious minority groups in Russia.83 
B. The 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s Substantive Restrictions on 
Fundamental Rights to Freedom of Religion or Belief 
On its face, Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law 
boasts the lofty objective of ensuring freedom of worship and relig-
ion. Article 1 begins with the proclamation that “[t]he aim of the 
present law is to ensure the right of every person to freedom of wor-
ship and religion, and the citizens equality irrespective of their reli-
 
 79. For an in depth study of the harsh consequences of Russia’s 1997 law “On Freedom 
of Conscience and Religious Associations”, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, 
Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Ap-
praisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101 (1998); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, Caesar’s Sword: The 
1997 Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, 12 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 43 (1998). For the full text of the law, see Law of the Russian Federa-
tion, On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, Federal Law No. 125-FZ (Sept. 
26, 1997), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rfarch File [hereinafter Russia’s 1997 Freedom 
of Conscience Law]. 
 80. See Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 79 (President Yeltsin 
signed Russia’s Freedom of Conscience Law on September 26, 1997). 
 81. The December 1997 violence resulting in police fatalities in the Uzbek region of 
Namangan has all been attributed to religious extremism and to Wahhabism in particular. See 
1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. 
 82. Uzbekistan has long been ‘connected at the brain’ with Russia; Uzbekistan was lit-
erally ‘born’ of Soviet masterminds. Unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which existed long be-
fore the rise of even the Russian Imperial Empire, Uzbekistan was a Soviet political creation of 
the 1920s. Not only were leaders carefully chosen, but even borders were strategically drawn 
with the express purpose of dividing religious and ethnic groups that might otherwise unite 
against the Soviet regime. See JOHN ANDERSON, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF CENTRAL 
ASIA 26 (1997) (stating that Central Asians “turned Bolsheviks” were responsible for carrying 
out the wishes of Moscow in Uzbekistan in the early years of its formation); Piacentini, supra 
note 1, at 25 (stating that borders were artificially drawn to reduce regional unity); see also 
MEHRDAD HAGHAYEGHI, ISLAM AND POLITICS IN CENTRAL ASIA 5 (1995) (stating that the 
Russian Imperialist regime had also divided central Asian countries along artificial lines to 
weaken tribal cohesion). 
 83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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gious convictions . . . .”84 Despite such an admirable preface, subse-
quent provisions immediately reveal that freedom of religion rhetoric 
such as that found in Article 1 is little more than sugar coating in-
tended to make the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law more palat-
able to international peers.85 In actuality, the 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law, coupled with Karimov’s aggressive implementation of 
its provisos, entails one of the most dangerous campaigns against or-
ganized religion to be found anywhere in the post-Soviet Central 
Asian region, and perhaps even in any of the twenty-seven post-
communist (newly independent) states.86 
Restrictions of fundamental religious liberties are found scattered 
throughout the twenty-three articles that comprise Uzbekistan’s 
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law; however, they seem to fall into 
three basic categories: (1) provisions restricting freedom to manifest 
religious convictions, (2) provisions restricting freedom to dissemi-
nate religious ideas, and (3) provisions restricting freedom to assem-
ble for religious purposes. Importantly, most of the controversial 
provisions limit not only one of the above listed fundamental rights, 
but all of them simultaneously. 
1. Provisions restricting freedom to manifest religious convictions 
Article 18.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), to which Uzbekistan acceded on September 28, 
1995, states in part that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion,” which right specifically in-
cludes the freedom to “to manifest [a] religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching.”87 Multiple provisions in Uzbeki-
stan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience law constitute clear violations of 
ICCPR 18.1 and related international covenants.88 
 
 84. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 1. 
 85. On the international front, the Karimov administration has gone to great lengths to 
put its best foot forward on issues of religious tolerance. For example, the official Uzbek gov-
ernment web site for the Uzbekistan Embassy in the United States contains an extensive and 
very optimistic survey on human rights and religious tolerance in Uzbekistan.” See generally 
<http://www.uzbekistan.org/newsletter.html> (visited Mar. 16, 2000) . 
 86. See CSCE News Release, supra note 21 (stating that Chairman Smith of the Com-
mission on Cooperation and Security in Europe recently stated that “[s]ince mid-1992, Uz-
bekistan has been one of the most repressive New Independent States under President Islam 
Karimov.”). See generally Corley, supra note 22. See also Corley, supra note 77. 
 87. ICCPR supra note 67, at art. 18.1.  
 88. Upon accepting membership in the UN and the OSCE in 1992, Uzbekistan also 
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a. Only clergy are allowed to wear “religious attire” in public. Arti-
cle 14 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law prohibits any citizen 
of Uzbekistan except a religious organization’s “ministers,” from ap-
pearing in public places “in religious attire.”89 The practical effect of 
this broad restriction is to virtually outlaw the deeply rooted Islamic 
traditions of beards and headscarves.90 This type of statutory prohibi-
tion against religious dress is explicitly denounced by section 18.1 of 
the ICCPR91 and punctuated by General Comment 22 of United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, which clarifies that “[t]he ob-
servance and practice of religion or belief may include not only 
ceremonial acts but also such customs as . . . the wearing of distinc-
tive clothing or headcoverings.”92 
Prior to the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, Uzbek universi-
ties had already begun to address the “political danger” of permit-
ting students to wear religious dress in school.93 Thus, it is not sur-
 
committed itself to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the 1983 
Madrid Concluding Document, the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, the 1990 Copenha-
gen Human Dimension Document, the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1994 Budapest Con-
cluding Document. See Corley, Uzbekistan’s New Legislation on Religion: An Assessment 2 
(2000); see also U.N. Members, supra note 72; OSCE Members, supra note 71. 
 89. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 14. 
 90. Numerous governmental and non-governmental reports verify that on multiple oc-
casions men with beards have been arbitrarily arrested and forced to shave on the grounds that 
a beard is “Wahhabi.” See 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8; AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 22; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON 
UZBEKISTAN (1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/europe/ 
uzbekistan.html> [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]. Likewise, even women dressed in 
traditional Islamic hijab scarves are often viewed as potential threats to national security. See 
also CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19, at n.8 (subsection entitled “The ‘Uzbek Way’”). 
 91. Section 18.1 of the ICCPR states: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 18.1. 
 92. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, “General Comment Adopted by 
the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,” ICCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 27 Sept. 1993, Addendum, Gen-
eral Comment No. 22 (48) (art. 18) [hereinafter General Comment 22]. 
 93. The Institute for Oriental Studies amended its charter in January 1998 to prohibit 
clothing that “attracts attention,” including clothing that covers the face. Prior to the adoption 
of these amendments, the institute’s rector had reprimanded students for religious attire, and 
had even barred at least one student from her dormitory. CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19 
(subsection entitled “Laws and Rules for Regulating Religious Attire”). As of February 27, 
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prising that following the May 1 enactment of the 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law, universities were increasingly pressured to redraft 
their dress codes so as to effectively ban religious dress, which forced 
the expulsion of many students who chose not to comply.94 There-
fore, in addition to violating ICCPR 18, Article 14 of the 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law also violates Uzbekistan’s obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”), which states that “higher education shall be 
made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity”95 and that 
“the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.”96 
b. Religious activity is regulated as a matter of national security. 
Article 3 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law states that free-
dom of worship “or any other conviction” can be “subject only to 
the restrictions necessary to ensure national security, public order, 
and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of other citizens.”97 The 
“necessary to ensure national security”98 language comes directly 
from ICCPR 18.3 and the constitutions and laws of most countries 
contain similar provisions restricting the activity of private individuals 
in the name of legitimate public interest.99 But Uzbekistan’s 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law takes the concept of state-justified re-
strictions on personal religious freedom much further than the inter-
 
1998, Tashkent State University’s code of conduct prohibited clothing that “attracts atten-
tion” and instructed students to wear clothing “corresponding to modern demands.” See id.; 
see also id. at n.36. 
 94. For example, on May 27, 1998, the Pediatric Medical Institute’s internal rules were 
amended to ban religious dress and declare violators “ineligible” to study at the institute. The 
institute’s Rector had already instructed students to remove their religious clothing. Expulsions 
began in a matter of days. See CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19. 
 95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966), entry into force January 3, 1976, art. 13.1(c) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 96. Id. at art. 2.2. 
 97. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 3. 
 98. For further discussion of the “necessary” component of limitations clauses in relig-
ion laws, see Gunn, supra note 79, at 91. 
 99. For a few examples from other Eastern European and Central Asian countries (this is 
by no means an exhaustive international list), see RUSS. CONST. Art 55, 56 (1993); BULG. 
CONST. art. 57 (1991); BELR. CONST. art. 23 (1994); ARM. CONST. art. 44 (1995); KAZ. 
CONST. art. 32 (1995); KYRG. CONST. art. 21 (1993). 
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national norm. Not only does it make religious activity subject to na-
tional security interests but it goes so far as to make religious activity 
itself a matter of national security (i.e., religious offenses are regu-
lated and punished as if they were national security offenses). For ex-
ample, Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law explicitly 
states that “[t]he use of religion for anti-state and anti-constitutional 
propaganda,” and “activity of religious organizations, movements, 
and sects which encourage terrorism, drug trade and organized 
crime, and other mercenary ends” is “inadmissible” and “banned.”100 
Thus, the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law injects an air of crimi-
nality into religious activity by implying that it is an inherently dan-
gerous and subversive practice. This conclusion is further supported 
by amendments101 to Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code which punish un-
registered religious activity on an equal footing with such matters as 
corruption, organized crime, and narcotics102 by imposing a penalty 
of up to five years imprisonment or one hundred times the minimum 
monthly salary for various religious offenses (even if the offenses in-
volve no violence).103 
In practice, the Karimov regime selectively overemphasizes the 
language in ICCPR 18.3 that freedom to manifest religion or beliefs  
 
 
 100. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5 
 101. The law amending the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan was passed by Parliament on 
May 1, 1998, the same day that the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law was approved. See gen-
erally On Introduction of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Republic 
Uzbekistan (1998) (Uzb.). 
 102. The National Security Service (“NSS”) is notorious for arbitrarily arresting and im-
prisoning alleged Islamic “extremists” and other religious minorities. The NSS often uses “tor-
ture, harassment, illegal searches and wiretaps, and arbitrarily detains or arrests opposition ac-
tivists and other citizens on false charges, frequently planting narcotics or weapons on them.” 
1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. 
 103. For example, Article 145 of the amended Criminal Code states in part: 
Religious activity involving obstructing citizens in execution of their civil rights or 
performing their civil duties, forced taxation of the believers or using measures com-
promising personal dignity, or forcing to receive religious education or influencing 
citizens in defining their attitude towards religion, to practice or not to practice re-
ligion, to participate or not to participate in religious services, rites, religious cere-
monies . . . is subject to fines equal from seventy five to one hundred minimal sala-
ries or imprisonment from three to five years. 
On Introduction of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Republic Uzbeki-
stan art. 145 (1998) (Uzb.). See also 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (stating that 
the series of revisions to the criminal and civil code “stiffen the penalties for violating the relig-
ion law and other statutes on religious activities”). 
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“may be subject to such limitations as are prescribed by law,”104 and 
severely underemphasizes (even summarily dismisses) the full context 
of ICCPR 18.3, which clearly conveys that freedom to manifest 
religion or beliefs may be subject “only to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.”105 As to what constitutes “necessary,” the European Court of 
Human Rights (“European Court”) prefers to use the term “propor-
tionate” when defining the statutory concept of “necessary.”106 A 
treatise on the doctrine of proportionality in European Law illus-
trates how the concept of proportionality is applied by the European 
Court: 
[T]he principle of proportionality, as a judge-made doctrine of 
public law, requires that [an] action by public authorities must be 
geared to the objective it seeks to attain, and should consequently 
form part of a quantifiable [casual] relationship between means and 
ends aimed at achieving a desired end. Proportionality, in abstract 
terms, simply means that public authorities shall take no action the 
overall costs of which are excessive in relation to its overall bene-
fits.107 
According to the European Court’s interpretation of “necessary” 
or “proportional,” it is hardly a defensible position that the Karimov 
regime’s broad-sweeping and punitive measures enforced against vir-
tually all basic forms of religious activity in Uzbekistan are “neces-
sary” to protect public safety and fundamental freedoms. 
In any event, ICCPR 4.1 expressly states that no derogation of 
the religious freedoms guaranteed in ICCPR 18 is permitted, even 
“in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion . . . .”108 This remarkable qualification stresses that although 
many other personal rights may be impinged upon in the name of 
state interest—governmental restriction of this particular personal 
right, namely the freedom to manifest religious belief—is extremely 
limited, even under the umbrella of the 18.3 “necessary to protect” 
 
 104. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 18.3. For further discussion of the “prescribed by 
law” component of limitations clauses in religion laws, see Gunn, supra note 79, at 83-84. 
 105. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 18.3 (emphasis added). 
 106. Gunn, supra note 79, at 92. 
 107. NICHOLAS EMILIOUS, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 6 (1996). 
 108. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 14.1. 
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exception. Therefore, sporadic religious violence (indeed, even wide-
spread religious violence if it existed) is not ample justification for 
the Karimov regime’s lawless departure from ICCPR 18. 
2. Provisions restricting freedom to disseminate religious ideas 
ICCPR 19 states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference,” and that “[e]veryone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression” which includes “freedom to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”109 At least five specific provi-
sions of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law constitute 
clear violations of ICCPR 19 and related international covenants.110 
a. Proselytism and “any other kind of missionary activity” is 
prohibited. Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law ex-
pressly states that “[a]ctions aimed at converting believers of one re-
ligion to another (proselytism) as well as any other missionary activ-
ity are prohibited.”111 This restriction, though formerly present in  
 
 
 
 109. Id. at art. 19. 
 110. Any provisions that restrict freedom to disseminate religious ideas also violate the 
Vienna Concluding Document, ICCPR, General Comment No. 22, and UDHR. See Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Concluding Document from the Vienna Meet-
ing, Nov. 4, 1986-Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527, at art. 16.9 [hereinafter Vienna Concluding 
Document]. The Vienna Concluding Document can also be found at <http://www1.umn. 
edu/humanrts/peace/docs/oscevienna.html> (visited Mar. 16, 2000) (“In order to ensure 
the freedom of the individual to profess and practice religion or belief, the participating States 
will, inter alia . . . respect the right of individual believers and communities of believers to ac-
quire, possess, and use sacred books, religious publications in the language of their choice and 
other articles and materials related to the practice of religion or belief.”); id. at art. 16.10 (stat-
ing that freedom of expression includes “allow[ing] religious faiths, institutions and organiza-
tions to produce, import and disseminate religious publications and materials,”); ICCPR, supra 
note 67, at art. 18 (everyone shall have the freedom “either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, prac-
tice and teaching”); ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 19 (stating that the freedom of expression 
includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice”); General Comment No. 22, supra note 92 (stating that the freedom to prepare 
and distribute religious texts or publications is protected by ICCPR 18); UDHR, supra note 
66, at art. 19 (stating that freedom of expression includes “freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and re-
gardless of frontiers.”). 
 111. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
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Uzbekistan’s 1991 Religion law,112 is stated much more specifically 
in the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law.113 Though not spelled out 
in the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law itself, criminal penalties for 
“any kind of missionary activity” now range from a fine of fifty to 
one hundred times the minimum monthly wage114 and can result in 
as many as three years of imprisonment.115 
b. Only religious organizations which are granted the legal status of 
“centralized organ of management” can disseminate religious 
literature. Article 19 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law states 
that only religious organizations which are granted the legal status of 
“centralized organ of management” (“centralized administrative 
body”) have the right to disseminate religious literature.116 The legal 
status of “centralized administrative body” is extremely difficult to 
obtain.117 Hence, on its face, Article 19 acts as an effective barrier to 
free distribution of religious literature; however, the government 
continues to assert that “[a]ll religious organizations have the right 
to receive religious literature without having to pay customs du-
ties,”118 which may indicate some relaxation of the Article 19 barrier. 
 
 112. The 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law, in listing activities that were not allowed by 
religious organizations, included at the end of the list “and also missionary activity.” 1991 
Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 76, at art. 5. 
 113. The 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law broadens “missionary activity” to include 
“actions aimed at converting believers of one religion to another,” “proselytism,” and “any 
kind of missionary activity.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
 114. Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan art. 216.2, reprinted in On Introduc-
tion of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Republic Uzbekistan (1998) 
(Uzb.). The minimum monthly wage is approximately $11 (U.S.), meaning that fines can 
range from $550 to $1,100 (U.S.) (the equivalent of four to eight years of wages for the aver-
age Uzbek citizen). See CLASS DISMISSED, supra note 19 (subsection entitled “Laws and Rules 
Regulating Religious Attire: International Law”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
90. 
 115. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 90. 
 116. Article 19 reads: “Central administrative bodies are entitled to manufacture, export, 
import, and distribute objects of religious designation, religious literature and other informa-
tion materials of religious contents in the order proscribed by legislation of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 19. 
 117. See infra Part III.B.3.b (discussing requirements to form a religious organization) 
and infra Part III.B.3.c (discussing the requirement that a central administrative body must 
have at least eight registered religious organizations from eight different territorial entities of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan). 
 118. Uzbekistan Embassy Website, subsection entitled “Human Rights Institutions,” 
(visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.uzbekistan.org/newsletter.html> (containing the 
Uzbek government’s statement that “since independence, the Muslim’s sacred book, The Ko-
ran, has been translated into the Uzbek language and is in mass circulation. The Uzbek transla-
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The fact remains, however, that the government continues to require 
that all imported religious literature be censored by the state.119 Pro-
hibiting the free flow of religious literature, whether directly or indi-
rectly, is a violation of numerous international covenants to which 
Uzbekistan is a party.120 
c. Private teaching of religious principles is prohibited. Article 9 of 
the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law states that “[p]rivate teaching 
of religious principles is prohibited.”121 Unlike many of the other 
controversial rules in the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, this rule 
is not new to the people of Uzbekistan. It was also present in Uz-
bekistan’s 1991 Religion Law,122 which is indicative of the deeply 
rooted Soviet apprehension concerning “underground” religious 
movements that originate in places not customarily subject to gov-
 
tion of The Bible was completed abroad and has been distributed in a circulation of 25 thou-
sand copies.”). 
 119. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 90. The Human Rights Watch Report for 
1999 stated in part: 
There was no free and independent media in Uzbekistan. The State Control Inspec-
torate continued to censor all press materials, and a new government body, the 
Qanoat (Uzbek for abstemiousness) Center, was established in 1998 to review all re-
ligious literature and video and audio tapes, with the aim of stopping the flow of 
certain religious materials from abroad. Rahmonberdi Abdurakhmanov, an official of 
the Procuracy General, aptly stated in July that with the establishment of the Qanoat 
Center, “no non-state organization or state organization has any right to do any-
thing concerning religion without the knowledge of our state.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 120. Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 14609, at art. 16.9 (“In order to ensure 
the freedom of the individual to profess and practise religion or belief, the participating States 
will, inter alia, . . . respect the right of individual believers and communities of believers to ac-
quire, possess, and use sacred books, religious publications in the language of their choice and 
other articles and materials related to the practise of religion or belief.”); id. at art. 16.10 (stat-
ing that freedom of expression includes “allow[ing] religious faiths, institutions and organiza-
tions to produce, import and disseminate religious publications and materials.”); ICCPR, supra 
note 67, at art. 18 (stating that everyone shall have the freedom “either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching”); ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 19 (stating that freedom of 
expression includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice”); General Comment No. 22, supra note 92 (stating that the free-
dom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications is included in ICCPR 18); 
UDHR, supra note 66, at art. 19 (stating that freedom of expression includes “freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers”). 
 121. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 9. 
 122. 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 76, at art. 9. See also Corley, supra 
note 77. 
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ernment control, such as private homes. In this respect, the Uzbek 
Freedom of Conscience Law is now far more restrictive than the 
1997 Russian Freedom of Conscience Law, which does not forbid 
teaching of religious principles in the home and which under many  
circumstances will allow unregistered123 religious groups to meet in 
homes.124 
The net effect of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s restric-
tion of private teaching of religious principles is the virtual prohibi-
tion of all religious teaching that does not fall under the purview of 
the Karimov regime. This is because the only alternative to private 
teaching of religious principles is public teaching of religious princi-
ples, but the teaching of public religious principles is severely re-
stricted as it is a function reserved primarily for certain state spon-
sored universities125 and secondarily for the highly regulated realm of 
religious associations.126 Ironically, Karimov’s emphasis on keeping 
religion separate127 from the “secular” government of Uzbekistan 
 
 123. Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 79, at art. 7.1-7.2 (stating 
that a religious group in Russia is only required to inform the local administration that the reli-
gious group intends to operate, and that a religious group is defined as “any voluntary associa-
tion of citizens set up with the objective of joint profession and dissemination of faith, carrying 
on its activities without the registration with the state authorities and without the acquisition of 
capacity of a legal entity”) (emphasis added). 
 124. CSCE News Release, supra note 21. 
 125. For a list of religious educational institutions that the Uzbek government claims to 
have registered, see Uzbekistan’s Embassy Website (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www. 
uzbekistan.org/newsletter.html> (subsection entitled “Religious Education”). Note that with 
exception of a Russian Orthodox Seminary, a Protestant Seminary, and a Jewish Seminary, all 
existing religious education institutions are run by the government-sponsored Spiritual De-
partment of Muslims of Uzbekistan. Similarly, religious education is only permitted at the 
higher education level; primary and secondary religious education is forbidden by law. See 
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at arts. 7, 9. 
 126. The following articles from the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law (nearly half of the 
23 total) regulate or limit the activity of religious organizations: art. 8 (“Religious Organiza-
tions”); art. 9 (“Religious Schools”); art. 10 (“Religious Organization’s Rules”); art. 11 
(“Registration of Religious Organizations”); art. 12 (“Refusal to Register a Religious Organi-
zation”); art. 13 (“Discontinuation of a Religious Organizations Activity”); art. 15 (“Religious 
Organization’s Property”); art. 18 (“Disposal of Property of Religious Organizations which 
have Ceased Their Activities”); art. 19 (“Religious Literature and Objects of Religious Desig-
nation”); art. 23 (“Responsibility for Breaking the Legislation on Freedom of Religious Or-
ganizations”). See 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6. 
 127. Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law states that “in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan religion is separated from the state.” Likewise, Article 7 states that “[t]he educa-
tion system in the Republic of Uzbekistan is separate from religion. Introduction of religious 
subjects into an academic curriculum is inadmissible.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, su-
pra note 6, at arts. 5, 7. 
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does not seem to preclude Karimov from sponsoring128 religious 
education that is sympathetic to his regime. At the same time, Kari-
mov jealously guards129 the right to regulate130 religious education 
that is potentially unsympathetic to his regime, even if the targeted 
religious education is nonviolent. 
As relates to international covenants protecting rights to religious 
education, the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s prohibition of 
private teaching of religious principles broadly violates ICCPR 19.2, 
which guarantees the right “to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,”131 and explicitly vio-
lates ICCPR 18.1 which states that the right to “freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion” shall include “freedom to have or 
to adopt a religion or belief of [personal] choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teach-
ing.”132 
d. The use of religion to spread “destabilizing ideas” is prohibited. 
In addition to prohibiting missionary activity, Article 5 of the 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law also goes so far as to prohibit what the 
government deems to be “destabilizing” religious ideas.133 For the 
most part, the definition of “destabilizing ideas” is left open for arbi-
trary interpretation, although Article 5 demonstrates the intended 
breadth of the clause by ensuring that any religious ideas that are 
 
 128. In September 1998, Karimov attended the opening of the Tashkent Islamic Univer-
sity, which was established by presidential decree. The university will teach the history and phi-
losophy of Islam as well as Islamic law. Karimov said that instruction will be based “on original 
sources handed down from [our] ancestors” and that “inadequate knowledge of Islam ‘results 
in delusions among young people and tragic consequences.’” Justin Burke, Islamic University 
Opens in Uzbekistan, BBC MONITORING SERVICE 90799 (Sept. 7, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 
2000) <http://soros.org/uzbkstan/omri/0292.html>. See also 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKI-
STAN, supra note 8 (noting that the government funds the university). 
 129. In an aggressive speech to the Oliy Majlis (parliament), President Karimov “threat-
ened to shoot Wahhabis personally if deputies failed to approve the new law.” Corley, supra 
note 22. 
 130. In June 1998, one month after the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law was passed, 
new regulations covering registration of religious organizations were issued. The new regula-
tions required documentation, approvals and large fees from numerous state institutions before 
an application for religious organization status would even be considered. Also, re-registration 
for formerly registered religious organizations was required by August 15, 1998. Not surpris-
ingly, many failed to qualify or were denied re-registration. See Corley, supra note 22. 
 131. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 19.2. 
 132. Id. at art. 18.1. 
 133. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
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“anti-state,” “anti-constitutional,” “incit[ing of] hostility, hatred, or 
inter-ethnic discord,” or “undermin[ing of] ethical norms and civil  
accord” will automatically qualify as “destabilizing” and will be 
“prosecuted by the law.”134 
Given the sporadic occurrences of religious-based terrorism, the 
Karimov regime may argue that ICCPR 19.3 (which holds that free-
dom of expression is “subject to certain restrictions”) allows the type 
of current government limitations placed upon Uzbek citizens’ free-
dom to disseminate religious ideas. But such an argument is flawed. 
ICCPR 19.3 has very limited and narrow application (similar to 
ICCPR 18.3), in that freedom of expression can only be impinged 
upon by the state when necessary “[f]or respect of the rights or repu-
tations of others” and “[f]or protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”135 The 
government of Uzbekistan has not proved that sporadic incidences 
of “destabilizing” religious-based terrorism can be curbed by the 
wholesale restriction of the freedom to disseminate religious ideas. 
Indeed, history suggests that undue restriction of the freedom to dis-
seminate religious ideas may in fact be the greater threat to national 
security.136 
Despite the relative ambiguity as to exactly when the label of 
“destabilizing ideas” can be pinned upon any particular religious or-
ganization’s doctrines, one thing is made absolutely clear by the 
drafters of Article 5: religious activity has criminal repercussions,137 
and individuals who choose to practice or discuss religious principles 
with friends or family will do so at their own peril.138 
e. Involvement of minors in religious organizations is prohibited. 
Article 3 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law states that 
“[i]nvolvement of minors in religious organizations as well as teach-
ing them any religion against their will, or the will of their parents or 
custodians is inadmissible.”139 Taken together with the fact that  
 
 134. Id. 
 135. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 19.3. 
 136. See Goble, supra note 22 (stating that government action against what some call 
“politicized Islam” and others “Islamic fundamentalism” had actually strengthened these 
groups). 
 137. See generally Corley, supra note 77. 
 138. See CSCE News Release, supra note 21 (stating that even a communal Bible study is 
prohibited in private apartments). 
 139. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 3. 
BEC-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:12 PM 
997] Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty 
 1027 
(1) public religious education is forbidden until a child has success-
fully completed state mandated primary and secondary education,140 
and (2) private religious education is expressly forbidden,141 the re-
sult of Article 3’s prohibition against minors’ participation in reli-
gious organizations is to completely deny children the right to be 
exposed to religious teaching until they have reached college age.142 
ICESCR 13.3 protects the fundamental right of parents and children 
to engage in both private and public religious education: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have re-
spect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians 
to choose for their children schools, other than those established by 
the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educa-
tional standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and 
to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions.143 
Hence, the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s prohibition of 
minor’s rights to receive religious education is a violation of the 
ICESCR and other related international covenants to which Uzbeki-
stan is a part.144 The government’s perceived need to keep minors 
away from “destabilizing” religious ideas is a partially justifiable cul-
tural and historical construct stemming from the clandestine activity 
of the Wahhabi extremists. But the government’s broad-brush ap-
proach of altogether foreclosing children from receiving religious 
education is reminiscent of the decree of a first century Jewish king 
who ordered the death of all the infants in his kingdom so as to ex-
 
 140. Article 9 of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law holds in part that “citi-
zens can enter a higher or secondary religious school after receiving general compulsory secon-
dary education in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Education.” 
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 9; see also id. at art. 7 (“Introduction 
of religious subjects into an academic curriculum is inadmissible.”). 
 141. “Private teaching of religious principles is prohibited.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law, supra note 6, at art. 9. 
 142. The compulsory education requirement mandates at least 9 years of state education 
before an individual may begin a religious college or higher education. See U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: 
UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. 
 143. ICESCR, supra note 95, at art. 13.3. 
 144. The Vienna Concluding Document, for example, provides that states must “respect 
the right of everyone to give and receive religious education . . . whether individually or in as-
sociation with others” and to “respect, inter alia, the liberty of parents to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.” Vienna Con-
cluding Document, supra note 14609, at art. 16.6-16.7. 
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terminate the threat that one of them may lead a future opposition 
movement against him.145 
In summary, compared to the 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law’s other provisions which limit freedom of religion, the various 
provisions which restrict the freedom to disseminate religious ideas 
(including restrictions on missionary activity, dissemination of reli-
gious literature, private teaching of religious principles, and religious 
teaching of minors), seem to be particularly harsh. Cultural and his-
torical explanations help to shed some light on the reason for Uz-
bekistan’s strong position against the free flow of religious ideas. But 
these explanations would seem only to justify a small portion of the 
laws and practices currently employed by the Karimov regime. 
3. Provisions restricting freedom to assemble for religious purposes 
In general, the natural right of freedom to assemble stems from a 
recognition that human beings are social creatures. Combined with 
the fact that nearly all of the world’s inhabitants also claim a natural 
right to determine their own religious beliefs, it should come as no 
surprise that the combination of these two rights (freedom to assem-
ble and freedom of religious belief) is an internationally protected 
freedom, namely the freedom to assemble for religious purposes. For 
example, Article 16.4 of the Vienna Concluding Document of 
1989146 states that governments must “respect the right of religious 
communities to establish and maintain freely accessible places of 
worship or assembly.”147 Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (“UDHR”) states that “[e]veryone has the right to free-
dom of peaceful assembly and association”148 and that freedom of re-
ligion includes the right “either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest [their] religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”149 At least three provi-
 
 145. The Biblical account of this event is found in Matthew 2:16, which states that 
Herod “slew all the children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts thereof, from two 
years old and under.” Matthew 2:16 (King James). The Herod referred to is Herod I, other-
wise known as Herod the Great, who was appointed King of Judea by Antony and Octavius 
during Roman occupation of Judea. See JAMES E. TALMAGE, JESUS THE CHRIST 100-01, n.3 
(1983); see also FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, 15 ANTIQUITIES OF THE JEWS. 
 146. Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 109. 
 147. Id. 
 148. UDHR, supra note 67, at art. 20. 
 149. Id. at art. 18. 
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sions of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience violate these and 
other international covenants pertaining to freedom of assembly for 
religious purposes. 
a. The creation of “social movements” based on religion is 
prohibited. Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom Conscience Law states 
that “the creation of religious political parties and public movements 
is inadmissible.”150 Exactly what constitutes a “public movement” 
(also translated as “social movement”) is left to the arbitrary inter-
pretation of the government. Since the 1991 Freedom of Conscience 
Law contained no such prohibition of religious “social move-
ments”151 there is reason to believe that this language is intended at 
least to discourage religious gatherings, especially large religious 
gatherings that could easily be pegged as “social movements.” 
If this language is used as a justification to prohibit religious 
gatherings, it constitutes a violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the 
ICCPR, which protect the right to peaceable assembly and freedom 
of association,152 even if there is a certain political element in-
volved.153 Interestingly, the 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law ex-
plicitly permitted religious organizations’ clergy to “participate in 
political life on an equal level with all citizens,”154 which provision is 
nowhere to be found in the 1998 version of the law. 
 
 150. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5 (1998) (Uzb.). 
 151. The only analogue in the 1991 version Freedom of Conscience Law is a restriction 
against religious organizations participating in or rendering financial support to political par-
ties. It is noteworthy that the 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law actually contained language 
that “[r]eligious organizations have the right to participate in social life,” which was subse-
quently stricken from the 1998 version of the law. See 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law, su-
pra note 76, at art. 5. 
 152. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 21 states that “the right of peaceful assembly shall be 
recognized.” 
 153. The ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 22 states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” Article 21 is qualified only by the statement that “[n]o restrictions 
may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.” Id. at art. 21. Similar to Article 21, article 22 is 
qualified only by the statement that “[n]o restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this 
right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the pro-
tection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Id. 
at art. 22. 
 154. 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 75, at art. 5. 
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b. A religious organization may not legally function until it has a 
minimum of one hundred adult citizen signatories. Article 8 of the 
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law prohibits registration of a reli-
gious organization until registration is applied for “at an initiative of 
not less than 100 citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan aged over 
eighteen and permanently residing on the territory of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan.”155 Although many newly independent states have 
“minimum member” requirements for registering religious organiza-
tions,156 Uzbekistan’s one-hundred-member requirement is widely 
recognized as constituting one of the harshest.157 In addition to the 
one-hundred-member requirement, the 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law also requires that an applicant religious association sub-
mit a significant amount of paperwork158 and receive multiple gov-
ernment “approvals”159 before being registered. On occasion, 
exceptions have been made to the one-hundred-member require-
ment to permit a few Christian and other small religious denomina-
tions to register;160 however, many religious groups who do not yet 
 
 155. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 8. 
 156. Geographically- and culturally-related countries such as Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, 
and Georgia, for example, all require a minimum of ten adult citizen signatories to register a 
religious organization. Uzbekistan’s 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law also required only ten 
adult citizen signatories. See 1991 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 76, at art. 13. 
 157. The March 1999 Helsinki Report to the OSCE stated that “in practice [the 100 
member requirement means], for example, most Protestant churches would have to be 
closed.” INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS 
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED VIOLATIONS OF HELSINKI COMMITMENTS: REPORT TO THE 
OSCE SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION (Mar. 
22, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/osce99/99reldis18. 
htm>. 
 158. According to Article 11, “a religious association should present the following 
documents: an application signed by not less than 100 citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
who initiate setting up of a religious organization; rules of the religious organization; a con-
stituent meeting protocol; a document certifying address of the religious organization being 
set up; a document certifying payment of the registration fee.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law, supra note 6, at art. 11. 
 159. See 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 6 (stating that the 
Committee for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers coordinates relations between 
religious organizations and the state); id. at art. 8 (stating that central or local departments of 
the Ministry of Justice grant registration and legal status); id. at art. 11 (stating that approval is 
required from the Ministry of Justice or regional justice departments along with approval of 
the Committee for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers). 
 160. The Uzbek Embassy Website states that “a special commission for resolving the dis-
putes in registration of small religious communities has been established and has already regis-
tered more than 30 small religious organizations with number of members less than a hun-
dred.” See Republic of Uzbekistan (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.uzbekistan.org>.  
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have one hundred members simply prefer not to risk bringing them-
selves to the attention of authorities by attempting to register.161 The 
registration requirements themselves do not violate international 
covenants so long as the requirements are administered impartially. 
But denial of registration is a common and politically safe way to ban 
religious groups that are not in favor with the government.162 Arbi-
trary denial of registration constitutes a violation of Article 16.3 of 
the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document.163 
Exacerbated by Article 5’s prohibition against unregistered “so-
cial movements,” the practical effect of Article 8’s one-hundred-
member requirement is to prohibit any religious group with less than 
one hundred members from gathering to share religious ideas or 
from participating in worship service together. Uzbekistan’s 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law contains no provision similar to that 
contained in Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience of Law, which 
allows for limited legal status of fledgling religious “groups”164 prior 
to obtaining the full legal status of a “religious association.”165 
c. In order to form a “central administrative body,” a religion 
must have at least eight registered religious associations from eight 
different “territorial entities.” Article 8 of the 1998 Freedom of Con-
science Law stipulates that “[a] central administrative body shall be 
set up at a constituent meeting (conference) of representatives of 
 
See also 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8 (noting that a few Christian organiza-
tions have been granted exemptions to the 100 member requirement). 
 161. See 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Article 16 of the Vienna Concluding Document states: 
[I]n order to ensure the freedom of the individual to profess and practise religion or 
belief, the participating States will, inter alia, . . . grant upon their request to com-
munities of believers, practising or prepared to practise their faith within the consti-
tutional framework of their States, recognition of the status provided for them in 
their respective countries. 
See Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 14609, at art. 16. 
 164. Article 7.1 of Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law defines a religious group as 
follows: 
Religious group under this Federal Law shall mean any voluntary association of citi-
zens set up with the objective of joint profession and dissemination of faith, carrying 
on its activities without the registration with the state authorities and without the 
acquisition of capacity of a legal entity. The premises and property required for the 
activities of the religious group shall be provided for such use by such a group of its 
members. 
Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 79, at art. 7.1. 
 165. See id. at art. 8. 
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registered organizations of an individual religion from at least eight 
territorial entities of the Republic of Uzbekistan . . . .”166 With the 
exception of the right to distribute religious literature,167 it is not en-
tirely clear what additional juridical privileges are granted to a central 
administrative body above and beyond those granted to a religious 
organization;168 however, if Uzbekistan’s concept of “central admin-
istrative body” is anything akin to Russia’s concept of “centralized 
religious organization,”169 the lack of “central administrative body” 
status may prove to be a significant prejudicial barrier to registration 
and activities of smaller religious organizations, even if member re-
quirements are otherwise met. 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding juridical privileges of a cen-
tral administrative body, it is clear that the “eight territorial entities” 
requirement of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law establishes 
significant financial and logistical obstacles that stand in the way of a 
religious organization receiving central administrative status. As dis-
cussed previously, this in turn acts as an effective prohibition against 
the freedom to disseminate religious literature. Thus, it is clear that 
Article 8 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law violates interna-
tional covenants pertaining to free dissemination of religious litera-
ture, and it is probable that Article 8 violates international covenants 
pertaining to freedom of assembly as well. 
To summarize, the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s prohibi-
tions of “social movements,”170 along with its stiff “100 member”171 
and “eight territorial entities”172 requirements make it clear that Uz-
bekistan has chosen to ignore its international obligations to protect 
the fundamental right of assembly for religious purposes. By way of 
numerous other provisions restricting such basic human rights as the 
freedom to manifest religious convictions and the freedom to dis-
seminate religious ideas, Uzbekistan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
 
 166. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 8. 
 167. Id. at art. 19. See supra Part III.B.2 for a more detailed discussion of a central ad-
ministrative body’s right distribute religious literature. 
 168. A nominally enlightening explanation of the intended purpose of a central adminis-
trative body is offered in Article 8, namely “[t]o coordinate and direct activity of organizations 
of an individual religion.” 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 8. 
 169. Russia’s 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 79, at art. 11. 
 170. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
 171. Id. at art. 8. 
 172. Id. 
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Law on the whole has become one of the most alarming campaigns 
against freedom of religion in all of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
combined.173 
C. The 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’s Criminalization of 
Religious Activity 
It is clear that infractions of religious association laws in Uzbeki-
stan can lead not only to the liquidation174 of previously registered 
organizations, but also to criminal punishment of religious organiza-
tions’ members and leaders who fail to properly comply with the new 
requirements of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law.175 Unregis-
tered religious activity, which has long been considered illegal, is 
now “severely punished under the amendments to the criminal and 
administrative codes adopted the same month [as the 1998 religion 
law].”176 Indeed Article 11 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience law 
reads like a criminal statute, explicitly stating that religious leaders’ 
“evasion” of registering with state bodies will be “punished” in ac-
cordance with the law.177 New provisions in Uzbekistan’s Criminal 
Code178 differentiate between “illegal” religious groups, and 
“prohibited” religious groups.179 According to Article 216.2 of the 
 
 173. Indeed, one United States State Department official recently called it “one of the 
harshest in the world.” See Justin Burke, U.S. Calls on Uzbekistan to Modify or Drop Religion 
Law, BBC MONITORING SERVICE (Feb. 16, 2000) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://soros. 
org/uzbkstan/omri/0431.html> (stating that U.S. State Department representative John 
Beyrle told Uzbek officials in Tashkent that Uzbekistan should modify or replace the 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law and that it is “one of the harshest in the world”). 
 174. See 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 13 (“[a]ctivity of a reli-
gious organization shall be halted at its own volition or if it violates this law or other laws of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan”). 
 175. See Corley, supra note 22 (stating that those who are found in contradiction of Uz-
bekistan’s 1998 religion law face monetary fines and prison sentences of up to five years). Of-
ten, the government will simply plant drugs, grenades, or bombs on individuals (generally 
leaders of non-traditional religions) whom the government wishes to apprehend for purposes 
of questioning and imprisonment. See id.; see also Uzbek Baptists Call For Protection From Gov-
ernment Threats, KESTON NEWS SERVICE (July 27, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http:// 
www.keston.org/scholarsframe.htm>. 
 176. Corley, supra note 22. 
 177. 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 11. 
 178. For a detailed discussion of how the Uzbek Criminal Code treats unregistered reli-
gious organizations, see KESTON NEWS SERVICE, Unregistered Religious Communities in Uz-
bekistan Face New Threat (May 20, 1999) (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http://www.keston.org/ 
scholarsframe.htm>. 
 179. 1999 REPORT ON UZBEKISTAN, supra note 8. 
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Criminal Code, “illegal” religious activity, which includes such in-
fractions as “failure of the leaders of religious organizations to regis-
ter,” and continuance of religious activities “after administrative ac-
tion has been taken,” is punishable by up to “one hundred minimal 
salaries” or “imprisonment [of] up to three years.”180 Even worse, 
“prohibited” religious activity (which is essentially involvement with 
a religious group that has been banned)181 is punishable by up to five 
years in prison.182 
To many westerners, Uzbekistan’s regulatory atmosphere seems 
extraordinarily repressive. Yet, as discussed earlier, terrorism in Uz-
bekistan often strikes under the cloak of religion. Therefore, Uzbeki-
stan’s 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law pegs religion as a cause of 
violence and bloodshed.183 The fundamental problem with the 1998 
Freedom of Conscience Law is not that it attempts to criminalize 
violence and bloodshed, but that it takes the critically overreaching 
step of criminalizing religion as a means of rooting out violence and 
bloodshed.184 
In all fairness to Karimov’s “national security” policies, western 
critics must recognize the legitimate difference in the relative danger 
between western types of “dangerous religious sects” (which are  
 
 
 
 
 
 180. Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan art. 216.2, reprinted in On Introduc-
tion of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Republic Uzbekistan (1998) 
(Uzb.). 
 181. Article 216 of Uzbekistan’s Criminal Code defines prohibited religious activity as 
“[o]rganization or renewal of the activity of prohibited social associations and religious group-
ings, as well as participation therein.” Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan art. 216, 
reprinted in On Introduction of Amendments and Additions into Legislative Acts of the Re-
public Uzbekistan (1998) (Uzb.). 
 182. See id. 
 183. This proposition of itself is not faulty. Differing religious ideas are unquestionably a 
cause of terrorist attacks, not only in Uzbekistan but in many other countries around the 
world. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 184. Article 5 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, for example, mandates that 
“[t]he state shall . . . not allow religious or other fanaticism and extremism aimed at . . . stir-
ring up hostility,” and “[a]ctivity of religious organizations, movements, and sects which en-
courage terrorism, drugs trade and organized crime, and other mercenary ends is banned.” 
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
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generally quite peaceful)185 and Uzbek types of “dangerous religious 
sects” (which, in the name of jihad, are potentially lethal).186 
But more importantly, and in all fairness to the generally peaceful 
institution of organized religion, the Karimov regime must recognize 
that large-scale prohibition of basic forms of religious activity as a 
means of dealing with terrorism is not only a blatant infraction of in-
ternational law, but a sure path leading to violence and bloodshed far 
in excess of that which is currently caused by sporadic terrorist at-
tacks. 
IV. FORWARD LOOKING CONSIDERATIONS: A COMPROMISE 
MODEL 
Part II of this Comment discussed some of the historical and cul-
tural constructs that gave rise to the 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law. Part III discussed some of the legal precedents that brought 
forth the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law and showed how many 
of the provisions in the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law violate in-
ternational covenants to which Uzbekistan has acceded. Part IV is 
less critical and more constructive: it suggests a compromise model 
that seems to be a less volatile and more effective approach to 
church-state relations than are currently employed by the Karimov 
regime. 
The proposed compromise model consists of two fundamental 
“shifts” that would help to ensure Uzbekistan’s maintenance of a 
moderate Islamic church-state model that mirrors neither the anti-
cleric extreme observed in Turkey nor the pro-cleric extreme ob-
served in Iran.187 The two fundamental shifts entail (1) amelioration 
of the overly restrictive 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law and (2) 
relaxed treatment of allegedly “subversive” religious minorities. 
 
 185. France, for example, recently established a government agency which oversees and 
regulates the activity of allegedly “dangerous” religious sects. A “dangerous” religious sect in 
France is rarely violent and is generally nothing more than a religious minority group with un-
orthodox religious views. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: FRANCE (1999) (visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1000/irf_france99.html> 
(stating that even such characteristics as “having judiciary problems” qualifies a religious or-
ganization for the label of “sect” or “cult” which merits official “public caution”). 
 186. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Islamic extremism and the notion of holy war). 
 187. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (illustrating the “competing” Iranian and 
Turkish ideologies that influence Uzbekistan). 
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A. Amelioration of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law 
In its most basic form, the problem with the 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law is that the legislative means do not square with the 
public policy ends. In other words, criminalizing all religious activity, 
including peaceable religious activity, does not root out the violent 
religious activity that was criminal to begin with. On the contrary, it 
stands to reason that a law that undertakes to criminalize fundamen-
tal and good human yearnings (such as teaching of religious princi-
ples in the home) will do nothing more than turn fundamentally 
good people into criminals. Further, a civil society cannot long en-
dure such a schism of core values and legal principles. Either peace-
able religion will be ignored in order to practice the law, or the law 
will be ignored in order to practice peaceable religion. In either case, 
the result is lawlessness: in the first instance due to disregard for re-
ligion and in the second instance due to disregard for the law. 
As it stands, the Uzbekistan model of church-state relations, and 
the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law in particular, tend toward an 
Islamic system not dissimilar to the current ultra-secular model in 
Turkey, which is marked by significant restrictions on freedom to 
manifest religious beliefs,188 state control of mainstream religious 
thought,189 state-mandated education in state-sponsored institu-
tions,190 and strict regulation of religious minorities that are either 
foreign or non-mainstream.191 
The consequences of this type of ultra-secular, anticleric, and 
even antireligious regime in Uzbekistan can be summed up by a con-
cept known as “polarization amplification.”192 In the religious free-
dom context, polarization amplification begins when the govern-
ment restricts the religious activity of a certain class of citizens.  
 
 188. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999: TURKEY (1999) [hereinafter 1999 REPORT ON TURKEY] 
(visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
1999/irf_turkey99.html>. 
 189. See id. 
 190. “Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compul-
sory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools.” TURK. CONST. art. 24 (1982). A 1997 
Turkish law mandates that the instruction be for a minimum of 8 years. 1999 REPORT ON 
TURKEY, supra note 188. 
 191. 1999 REPORT ON TURKEY, supra note 188. 
 192. This concept derives from unpublished comments by Professor Eileen Barker of the 
London School of Economics. 
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The restricted class instinctively retaliates in order to persuade the 
government to return the religious privileges that were restricted. 
The government, instead of conceding the religious privileges, inter-
prets the retaliation as a national security threat and steps up the re-
striction of religious privileges. Soon the restricted class adopts a 
martyr complex and other citizens begin to sympathize with the now 
“persecuted” class of believers. The momentum polarizes both sides 
of the conflict. The government’s restrictions and the citizens’ re-
taliation are increasingly polarized and amplified. The unavoidable 
end of polarization amplification is either total oppression of reli-
gious liberty or total destruction of the oppressing government. 
Thus, in accordance with the theory of polarization amplifica-
tion, Uzbekistan’s enactment of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience 
Law may well be exacerbating an already critical relationship between 
religious minorities and the Uzbek government. If Karimov truly in-
tends to curb the tide of religious-based violence, he must attempt 
first to reverse the pattern of polarized church-state relations and 
amplified church-state tensions by bringing the 1998 Freedom of 
Conscience Law into conformity with fundamental and internation-
ally recognized norms of religious liberty.193 
B. Relaxed Treatment of Allegedly “Subversive” Religious Minorities 
The first step of the compromise model entails amelioration of 
the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law. The second step entails re-
laxed treatment, and even a degree of congenial recognition, of pre-
sumed “subversive” religious minorities. The strategic assumption, of 
course, is that religious groups which have hitherto been forced to 
operate “underground” will be willing to trade some of their clan-
destine activity and violent animosity for a more “above ground” ap-
proach that might even result in some loyalty to the government. 
The compromise, therefore, is marked on the one side by Karimov 
easing his repressive grip on religious minority activity and on the 
other side by anti-government religious minorities abandoning their 
aspiration for total and absolute revolution. Admittedly, both steps 
call for an idealistic surrender of deeply rooted political and spiritual 
agendas, but granting even limited recognition of allegedly subver-
sive religious minorities may well avert the ultimate tragedy of revo-
 
 193. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (stating that United States government 
officials are also pushing for amelioration of the law). 
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lutionary or civil war.  Either of which could culminate in a cleric  
regime akin to that in Iran—where neither secularism nor diversity 
are tolerated.194 
V. CONCLUSION 
One Central Asia scholar has posited that “[a]ll of Central Asia’s 
rulers will sacrifice their new-found democratic values in an effort to 
defeat a popularly-led movement to defeat them,” and that 
“[b]laming their instability on Islamic ‘extremists’ may make their 
‘strong-man’ tactics more palatable to foreign leaders, leaving aid-
flows intact and buying them some additional time in power.”195 
This Comment argues that the government of Uzbekistan is clearly 
adopting just such a course of action. As evidence, Uzbekistan’s en-
actment of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law provides legal 
cover for gross violations of Uzbekistan’s international human rights 
obligations. The 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law restricts funda-
mental religious freedom based on concepts of “national security” 
and “public safety.” But Uzbekistan’s de jure and de facto restrictions 
of religious freedom are likely based more upon political expediency 
than public safety and should not be tolerated by the international 
community. 
In order to reverse the pattern of polarization amplification (i.e., 
polarized church-state relations leading to amplified church-state 
tensions) that threatens to turn Uzbekistan into a “new Kosovo,” 
President Islam Karimov must begin taking measures to curb the 
deeply seeded anxiety, much of which his regime has created, toward 
foreign and minority religious groups. 
By way of compromise, it seems that a better approach to curtail-
ing the spread of religious-based hostility entails a shift away from 
the Turkish anticleric model that may simultaneously ease the push 
by opposition forces for an Iranian type of cleric model. The first two 
steps toward attaining this “middle-of-the-road” compromise must 
include (1) amelioration of the overly restrictive 1998 Freedom of 
 
 194. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (indicating that Karimov himself admits 
that such a theocratic regime as is seen in Iran is not only possible in Uzbekistan, but a sub-
stantial threat). 
 195. Olcott, supra note 15, at 23. See also Graham E. Fuller, The Impact of Central Asia 
on the ‘New Middle East’, in CENTRAL ASIA MEETS THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 3, at 212, 
214 (stating that all the new leaders of Central Asian States, excluding Akaev, “are quite con-
tent to exclude democracy as ‘not part of the Central Asian tradition’”). 
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Conscience Law—a move on the government’s part away from 
Turkish ultra-secularism, and (2) relaxed treatment of allegedly 
“subversive” religious minorities—a concession by the government 
to avert a revolutionary cleric regime akin to that in Iran, which re-
gime could likely result if the subversive opposition is pushed until it 
prevails by force. 
For Karimov, and for the millions of Muslims, Christians, Jews, 
and other minority religious groups that have “elected” him to rep-
resent their interests, the highroad to stability and economic inde-
pendence is not one of government zarba or revolutionary jihad, but 
one of mutual tolerance and compromise that will build a bridge not 
only between Karimov and his people, but between Islam and the 
host of other faiths that aspire to peaceful coexistence in Uzbekistan. 
Grant Garrard Beckwith 
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Appendix  
 THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN ON FREEDOM OF 
WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS (NEW VERSION)196 
Article 1: The Aim of The Present Law 
The aim of the present law is to ensure the right of every person 
to freedom of worship and religion, and the citizens’ equality irre-
spective of their religious convictions, and to regulate relations aris-
ing from religious organizations’ activity. 
Article 2: Legislation on Freedom of Worship and Religious 
Organizations 
Legislation on freedom of worship and religious organizations 
consists of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the pre-
sent law and other legislative acts. Regulations to do with ensuring 
the freedom of worship and activity of religious organization in the 
[Autonomous] Republic of Karakalpakstan shall be in addition regu-
lated by the legislation of the Republic of Karakalpakstan. If an in-
ternational agreement of the Republic of Uzbekistan sets rules differ-
ent from those stipulated in the legislation of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan the provisions of the international agreement shall apply. 
Article 3: Freedom of Worship 
Freedom of worship is the citizens’ right guaranteed by the con-
stitution to profess or not to profess any religion. Any compulsion of 
a citizen in defining his religious convictions, deciding whether to 
profess or not, whether to take part in worship, religious rituals and 
ceremonies, or receive religious education is inadmissible. Involve-
ment of minors in religious organizations as well as teaching them 
any religion against their will, or the will of their parents or custodi-
ans is inadmissible. The freedom of worship or any other conviction 
are subject only to the restrictions necessary to ensure national secu-
 
 196.  As published in the Uzbek Press Narodnoye Slovo (Tashkent newspaper “People’s 
Word” in Russian), May 15, 1998. The English translation is courtesy of the OSCE’s Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, BBC, and Mr. Felix Corley of the Keston In-
stitute. 
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rity and public order, and life, health, morals, rights and freedoms of 
other citizens. Foreign citizens and people without citizenship enjoy 
the freedom of worship and religion equally with the citizens of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan and bear the responsibility the law envisages 
for breaching the legislation on freedom of worship and religious or-
ganizations. 
Article 4: Equality of Citizens Irrespective of Their Religious 
Convictions 
Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan irrespective of their reli-
gious convictions have the same legal rights. Indication of a citizen’s 
religious convictions in an official document is inadmissible. Any re-
striction of the rights and granting any direct or indirect privileges to 
citizens on the basis of their religious convictions, stirring up hostil-
ity or hatred or insulting citizens’ feelings on the basis of their reli-
gious or atheistic convictions, as well as the desecration of treasured 
religious sites shall be actionable in accordance with the law. Nobody 
can refuse to observe any legal obligations on grounds of his reli-
gious convictions. One legal obligation can be replaced by another 
on grounds of religious convictions only in cases envisaged by the 
law. 
Article 5: Separation of Religion from the State 
In the Republic of Uzbekistan religion is separated from the 
state. Granting any privileges to or imposing restrictions upon any 
individual religion is inadmissible. The state shall promote establish-
ment of mutual tolerance and respect between the citizens professing 
different religions and the non-believers, between religious organiza-
tions of different confession, and not allow religious or other fanati-
cism and extremism, and actions aimed at setting off one religion 
against another and stirring up hostility between them. The state 
shall maintain peace and accord between religious confessions. Ac-
tions aimed at converting believers of one religion into other (prose-
lytism) as well as any other missionary activity are prohibited. People 
responsible for violation of this rule shall bear responsibility in accor-
dance with the law. The state shall not charge religious organizations 
with carrying out any state functions, and shall not interfere into 
their activity provided it does not contradict the law. Religious or-
ganizations shall not fulfill any state functions. The state shall not fi-
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nance activity of religious organizations and activity propagating 
atheism. In the Republic of Uzbekistan creation and activity of reli-
gious political parties and public movements as well as branches and 
sections of religious parties set up outside the republic is inadmissi-
ble. Religious organizations are obliged to follow provisions of the 
existing legislation. The use of religion for anti-state and anti-
constitutional propaganda, and to incite hostility, hatred, inter-
ethnic discord, to undermine ethical norms and civil accord, to 
spread libelous, and destabilizing ideas, to create panic among the 
people and for other actions against the state, society and individual 
is inadmissible. Activity of religious organizations, movements, and 
sects which encourage terrorism, drugs trade and organized crime, 
and other mercenary ends is banned. Any attempts to pressure the 
state authority organizations and departments and officials as well as 
any illegal religious activity shall be persecuted by the law. 
Article 6: Rights of State Organizations and Citizens’ Self- 
Government Organizations in Their Relations with Religious 
Organizations 
The coordination of relations between state organizations and 
religious organizations and control over observation of the legisla-
tion on freedom of worship and religious organizations shall be car-
ried out by the Committee for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of 
Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The committee’s legal 
status shall be defined by a Regulation approved by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Council of Ministers of 
the Republic of Karakalpakstan, regional, district and town admini-
strations as well as citizens’ self-government organizations shall in 
accordance with the law bear responsibility for observation of the 
legislation on freedom of worship and religious organizations. 
Article 7: Education System and Religion 
The education system in the Republic of Uzbekistan is separate 
from religion. Introduction of religious subjects into an academic 
curriculum is inadmissible. The right to secular education is guaran-
teed to the citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan irrespective of 
their religious convictions. 
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Article 8: Religious Organizations 
A religious organization is a voluntary association of citizens of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan set up for joint profession of a religion, 
exercise of religious services, customs and rituals (religious societies, 
religious education establishments, mosques, churches, synagogues, 
monasteries and others). A religious organization shall be set up at 
an initiative of not less than 100 citizens of the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan aged over 18 and permanently residing on the territory of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan. To coordinate and direct activity of organi-
zations of an individual religion they may set up a single central ad-
ministration body for the Republic of Uzbekistan (further central 
administration body). A central administration body shall be set up 
at a constituent meeting (conference) of representatives of registered 
organizations of an individual religion from at least eight territorial 
entities of the Republic of Uzbekistan (a Region, the city of Tash-
kent, the Republic of Karakalpakstan). Religious organizations ob-
tain the status of a legal subject and can carry out their activities after 
their registration at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uz-
bekistan or its local departments in the order established by the law. 
Religious organization can be headed by citizens of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan having corresponding religious education. Foreign can-
didates to head a religious organization registered in the republic 
shall be approved by the Committee for Religious Affairs under the 
Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
Article 9: Religious Schools 
Religious organizations’ central administration bodies have a 
right to set up schools to train clergy and required religious person-
nel. Religious schools obtain the right to operate after their registra-
tion at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and re-
ceiving a corresponding license. Citizens can enter a higher or 
secondary religious school after receiving general compulsory secon-
dary education in accordance with the Law of the Republic of Uz-
bekistan On Education. People teaching religious subjects in reli-
gious schools should have religious education and can work with 
permission from a corresponding central administration body. Pri-
vate teaching of religious principles is prohibited. 
BEC-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:12 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1044 
Article 10: Religious Organization’s Rules 
 A religious organization’s rules should contain the following in-
formation: its name, form of organization, address and creed; aims, 
tasks and main forms of activity; structure and administration bodies; 
sources of funding and property relations within the organization; 
procedure for making amendments and addenda to the rules; other 
information on the religious organization. Rules of religious organi-
zations having a central administration body shall be approved by 
that administration body. 
Article 11: Registration of Religious Organizations 
Religious organizations’ central administration bodies shall be 
registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
and other religious organizations by the Ministry of Justice of the 
Republic of Karakalpakstan, regional justice departments, and the 
Tashkent city justice department respectively with approval of the 
Committee for Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan. To be registered a religious organization 
should present the following documents: an application signed by 
not less than 100 citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan who initiate 
setting up of a religious organization; rules of the religious organiza-
tion; a constituent meeting protocol; a document certifying address 
of the religious organization being set up; a document certifying 
payment of the registration fee. An application for registration of a 
religious organization’s central administration body should be sup-
ported by the following documents: an application signed by the 
chairman and secretary of the constituent meeting (conference); 
rules of the religious organization’s central administration body; the 
constituent meeting (conference) protocol; a document authorizing 
the founders; a document certifying the address of the management 
body; a document certifying payment of the registration fee. Regis-
tration applications from religious organizations and their central 
administration bodies shall be considered within a month from the 
date of their submission. Justice bodies have a right to ask corre-
sponding organizations for additional materials and experts’ judge-
ments on a religious organization applying for registration. In such 
case the decision shall be taken during three months from the date of 
application. Addenda and amendments to a religious organization’s  
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rules shall be registered in the same order and on the same terms as 
the religious organization itself. Religious organizations’ leaders’ 
evasion of registration of their organizations’ rules at state bodies will 
be punished in accordance with the law. Control over a religious or-
ganization’s compliance with its rules shall be carried out by a regis-
tering body. Officials who allow activity of non-registered religious 
organizations shall bear responsibility in accordance with the law. 
Article 12: Refusal to Register a Religious Organization 
A religious organization can be refused registration if provisions 
of its rules or other documents contradict provisions of the present 
law or other laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. A religious organi-
zation which is refused registration shall be notified about the deci-
sion by a letter specifying reasons for the refusal. The religious or-
ganization’s founders have a right to apply again to the Ministry of 
Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its local departments pro-
vided they bring their rules in line with the law. Refusal to register a 
religious organization or violation of provisions of the present law by 
justice agencies can be applied against with court. 
Article 13: Discontinuation of a Religious Organization’s Activity 
Activity of a religious organization shall be halted at its own voli-
tion or if it violates this law or other laws of the Republic of Uzbeki-
stan. A decision to halt the activity of a religious organization shall 
be taken by a registering body. The decision can be appealed against 
in a court of law. 
Article 14: Religious Rites and Ceremonies 
Religious organizations have a right to create and maintain facili-
ties for free worship and carrying out religious rites, and to maintain 
pilgrimage sites. Worship, religious rites and ceremonies shall be ex-
ercised at a religious organization’s premises, prayer buildings and 
other properties belonging to the organization, at pilgrimage sites, 
cemeteries, and in cases of ritual necessity and at citizens’ will at 
home. Worship and religious rites can be exercised in hospitals, nurs-
ing homes, detention centers, prisons and labor camps at the request 
of the people staying there. Public worship and religious rites can be 
held outside religious buildings in the order established by the law of  
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the Republic of Uzbekistan. Citizens’ of the Republic of Uzbekistan  
(except religious organization’s ministers) cannot appear in public 
places in religious attire. Religious organizations cannot subject be-
lievers to compulsory payment of money, or taxation, and to actions 
insulting their honor and dignity. 
Article 15: Religious Organization’s Property 
Religious organizations can own buildings, objects of veneration, 
facilities for production, social and charitable use, money and other 
property required to carry out their activity and bought or built with 
their own money or people’s or public associations’ donations, or 
given by the state. They can also own property in a foreign country 
and property obtained in the other ways envisaged by the law. Reli-
gious organizations’ right to property is protected by the law. 
Article 16: Use of State Property 
Religious organizations have a right to use for their needs build-
ings and other property handed over to them by state organizations 
under a contract. Historic or cultural sites and items can be handed 
over for use to religious organizations in accordance with the law. 
Religious organizations can be allotted land plots to build religious 
buildings in the established order and with permission of the Council 
of Ministers of the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and administrations 
of the Regions and the city of Tashkent, and the Cabinet of Minis-
ters of the Republic of Uzbekistan respectively. 
Article 17: Production of Goods and Services 
Religious organizations’ central administration bodies proceed-
ing from their aims set out in the rules have a right to set up in ac-
cordance with the legislation of the republic of Uzbekistan publish-
ing, production, restoration and construction, agricultural and other 
enterprises, as well as charity establishments (orphanages, hospitals). 
Article 18: Disposal of Property of Religious Organizations which have 
Ceased Their Activity 
After religious organizations have ceased their activity the prop-
erty transferred for their use is returned back to former owners. After 
religious organizations have ceased their activity the ownership of  
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their property is exercised in accordance with their Statutes and legis-
lation. The list of property designated for worship which may be  
freed from the claims of creditors is established by the Council of 
Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan on suggestions from reli-
gious organizations. In case there are no legal inheritors the property 
is turned into state ownership. 
Article 19: Religious Literature and Objects of Religious Designation 
Central administration bodies are entitled to manufacture, ex-
port, import, and distribute objects of religious designation, religious 
literature and other information materials of religious contents in the 
order proscribed by legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Deliv-
ery and distribution of religious literature published abroad is done 
after expertise of its contents is made in the order proscribed by 
legislation. Central administration bodies have an exclusive right to 
issue and distribute the objects of religious cult provided they have 
an appropriate license. Manufacture, storage, and distribution of 
printed matter, cinema, photo, audio, and video production and 
other materials formulating ideas of religious extremism, separatism, 
and fundamentalism entail responsibility in accordance with 
legislation. 
Article 20: Charity Activity 
Religious organizations can carry out charity activity. 
Article 21: Labor Relations in Religious Organizations 
Citizens working in religious organizations under a contract are 
subject to the labor legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
Article 22: International Relations of Religious Organizations 
According to legislation religious organizations are entitled to es-
tablish and maintain international relations for pilgrimages and par-
ticipation in other religious activities. 
Article 23: Responsibility for Breaking the Legislation on Freedom of 
Religious Organizations 
Officials, religious organizations’ ministers found guilty of violat-
ing the legislation on freedom of conscience and religious  
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organizations are subject to responsibility established by legislation 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan.197 
 
 197. Signed: Tashkent, 1 May 1998, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, I. Kari-
mov. 
